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The Truth about Law's Truth (1) 
"The normative question of how expert knowledge is best assessed, and how experts themselves 
are best evaluated and kept under a modicum of control, raises such intractable and viciously 
circular problems as to strangle speech". (Barnes and Edge, 1982, p.11). 
Introduction  
In this paper I want to discuss some issues arising from clashes or apparent clashes between 
legal and scientific conceptions of reality and methods of truth-finding.[2] The topics which 
will be considered include: Can there be different truths for law and science? How can we make 
sense of them? Is it possible to choose between them? I shall begin by providing some historical 
and intellectual background with reference to recent developments concerning the challenge 
of post-positivist arguments in the philosophy and sociology of law. I shall then analyse the 
different standpoints from which disputes between law and science may be examined and 
consider in detail efforts to develop a new approach to handling such clashes. I will conclude 
by illustrating the relevance of these theoretical considerations to two current controversies in 
criminal law and criminal procedure. 
The questions touched on in this essay are philosophically highly difficult and complex. Nor 
can I pretend to have found an answer to such characteristically post-modern problems as the 
dilemmas of reflexivity and self-reference which are entailed in operating at a meta-theoretical 
level of discourse (Lawson, 1982). Indeed, much of the literature I shall review is precisely 
concerned with whether it is meaningful to look for an 'answer' to clashes between competing 
discourses. But my hope is that this progress report on current work will contribute to the 
emerging agenda of what may be called meta-legal theory and practice. The subject-matter of 
this agenda may be described as how to avoid unreflective importation into law of competing 
disciplines without thereby falling back into a revisionist and politically one-sided exaggeration 
of law's independence as a discipline. In a wider context, a study of the degree to which legal 
and scientific discourses reinforce or corrode each other's power to persuade also provides an 
example. of the difficulty of controlling expert knowledges without doing so on the basis of 
some new form of expertise. 
I Disagreements between Law and Science 
It is not difficult to find examples of present and past disagreements between law and science. 
To choose only the most well-known, there are long-running disputes between legal and 
psychiatric conceptions of insanity, and volumes of research in which psychologists and 
statisticians criticise legal methods of proof. More generally, many social scientists reject the 
use judges make of concepts such as 'market efficiency' or 'group interest'; they are baffled by 
judges' willingness to predict outcomes of their decisions on little scientific evidence and their 
disinclination to check whether the predictions are in fact sound. 
The line between real clashes and only apparent ones is not always easy to draw.[3] Sometimes 
law and science are no more than superficially dealing with the same phenomenon. This could 
be said perhaps of legal and medical definitions of death.[4] In such cases different definitions 
reflect different purposes and concerns rather than a genuine dispute. Sometimes law is 
explicit about this, as in the distinction, internal to criminal and tort law, of 'factual' and 'legal' 
causation. At the other extreme, legal judgments do sometimes entertain scientific impossibi-
lities, as in decisions which have allowed a presumption of paternity even where this involved 
believing that a pregnancyhad lasted more than a year. To an extent law may use 'doublethink' 
to treat its 'legal fictions' as facts. In many of the most troublesome clashes between law and 
science, however, the real difficulty lies precisely in deciding whether the different conceptions 
in play represent genuine disagreement or not. As we will see, even where the law appears to 
be referring to empirically based notions such as 'provocation' or 'duress', the relevance of 
changing scientific findings remains uncertain and controversial. 
It may be objected that there is a ready way to resolve such disputes. This is to recognise the 
authority of law in legal contexts such as the courtroom and the priority of science in scientific 
arguments made in other contexts. Certainly, if there is an answer to our problem it would 
seem to involve appreciating what it means to say that truth varies in different contexts. It 
requires little skill to discover that the outcome of disagreements between law and science is 
different in arguments put before judges, in legal commentaries, and in multi-disciplinary law 
reform enquiries. Once again, however, the problem at the heart ofmanycurrent controversies 
is the difficultyof keeping the different contexts apart. What counts as a good argument in one 
context carries at least a specious plausibility outside its normal context. Both science and 
morality, for example, tend to assume the universal applicability of their arguments and both 
lay claim to law. At the same time law is often expected to adjudicate on the applicability of 
their enterprise. 
In many pressing cases of legal and scientific rivalry a practical solution has apparently been 
reached. Expert witnesses are introduced into the courtroom, where they are expected to 
protect the integrity of their discipline whilst at the same time serving the ends of the law. But 
this is often no more than a compromise rather than a solution of underlying differences. This 
is regularly demonstrated by complaints about the workings of the adversarial trial, although  
the source lies deeper than this. One experienced forensic expert recently complained that 
having to feed his scientific opinions through the adversarial process meant that truth emerged 
'bruised and mangled and possibly unrecognisable" (Gee, 1987). In his view, many recent 
'miscarriages of justice', could have been avoided if it had been possible to use evidence 
available, but not drawn on, at the time of the trial. This lament has particular force coming, 
as it does, from a member of a profession which can be said to specialise in the task of mediating 
between law and science. 
The changing background 
A number of social and intellectual developments have given the problem of legal and scientific 
clashes a new prominence and unsettled previously accepted solutions. These have led to 
increased questioning of the desirability and even the relevance of scientific and technical 
models for law. Although there are various currents and counter-currents of opinion we are 
beginning to see reduced enthusiasm for employing law as a method of 'social engineering', 
and on the contrary, a turn toward using law as a bulwark against technocracy. This has been 
accompanied by important developments in the philosophical understanding of both law and 
science. One result of this is renewed respect for the integrity of law as a form of knowledge 
and practice in its own right, with potentially equal status to science. I will say something more 
about each of these changes. 
In Britain and America for much of the post-war period there was a strong current running in 
favour of using law as a method of resolving social problems and pursuing social improvements. 
Scientific, and especially social scientific, approaches were considered highly valuable resour-
ces for such a project. Whilst there may have been some disagreement over whether it was 
better for social science to be 'on top' or on 'on tap'  (Witlock, 1974), its relevance was 
questioned by few other than traditionalists. Intellectual movements such as the 'Taw and 
Society Association" in the United States, or the 'law in context' approach to law teaching and 
research, in Britain, studied law's social consequences and its capacity to promote or retard 
social change. Yet it could be said that the 'law in context' movement failed to place itself in 
context. Its recommendation to see law as one amongst a variety of methods of pursuing social 
goals, and its treatment of law as an applied social science subject to the same requirements as 
other efforts at social intervention, tended to make it exaggerate the instrumental side of law. 
The more recent trend away from centralised intervention and regulation in Britain and 
America has provided fertile ground for the rediscovery that, criminal law, for example, is both 
more and less than an instrument for reducing the crime problem and that tort law is not merely 
a supposedly efficient means of responding to accidents. From our present vantage point it 
now seems as if the utility of social science perspectives on law is bound up with the advocacy 
of a particular role for law. 
Even in the United States, where an instrumentalist approach to law is deeply engrained in the 
wider pragmatic culture, the applicability of the substantive findings of the social sciences is 
now much less taken for granted than in the euphoric period following Brown v Board of 
Education.  For example, Martha Fineman, a feminist law professor at Wisconsin University, 
the original home of the 'Law and Society' Movement, has recently published articles in the 
Wisconsin and Harvard Law Reviews in which she calls into question the part played by social 
scientific expertise in custodial decision-making. Instead of welcoming the contribution that 
psychologists can make to this controversial area of law and social policy she sharply rejects 
the value of studies, which purport to show that fathers can do a good job of bringing up children 
themselves. In her view, decision-makers in these cases should not be influenced by attempts, 
deliberate or not, to use science to resolve what are "essentially legal, moral and political 
questions" (Fineman and Opie 1987). 
The same resistance to the hegemony of science in substantive matters also extends to 
differences between law and science over the best way to discover the truth of past events. 
There are now many scholars willing to defend the specifically legal rules and procedures of 
proof-taking even against the criticisms of psychologists or statisticians. Jonathan Cohen, for 
example, has developed a sophisticated defence of common-sense forms of inductive prob-
ability which, he says, underlie the trial process (Cohen, 1981). Zenon Bankowski argued that 
legal methods of truth-finding, including reliance on the jury system, cannot ever be undermi-
ned by psychologists because their discipline simply incorporates a different set of starting 
assumptions about how. to reach truth which are as much normative as scientific (Bankowski, 
1981). 
At its boldest, this new approach actually celebrates law's capacity to resist the spread of 
technocratic tendency to transform moral and political problems into technical ones.  Haber-
mas,  for example, in his critique of instrumental reason would prefer to see law serving the 
cause of 'practical' and 'critical' reason and stresses the dangers of allowing law to 'colonize 
the life-world' (Habermas,  1985). Sociologists of science, for their part, have shown interest 
in the way lawyers are able to puncture the claims of scientific expertise by revealing the frail 
platform of assumptions and conventional agreement which support scientific arguments 
(Wynne, 4989). Of course, there are probably few scientists who actually see themselves as 
technocractic warriors. When offering their findings, in or out of court, they expect them to 
be considered alongside moral, legal and political requirements, about which they claim no 
particular competence. One psychologist cited by Fineman, for example, responded to her 
attack by arguing that it was wrong to object to the accuracy of his studies of fathers' 
child-rearing capacities by pointing to the use others might make of his findings (Chambers, 
1987). But the current challenge to this positivistic scientific approach is whether it really is 
possible to mark out a realm of facts and findings for policy makers to use as they will, without 
that research already incorporating moral and political choices. 
These social and political changes can also be related to developments in post-positivist 
philosophies of science and of law. What is interesting here is the way such approaches are 
drawn on in order to undermine the older positivist concordat in which science was given the 
monopoly of producing factual truth, whilst law endorsed facts with normative significance. 
For purposes of illustration I shall mention just a few of the arguments which, in various ways, 
put in doubt the positivist distinction between theory-making and the factual objects of such 
theories. What they all share is the view that truth-claims take their sense from the interpre-
tative schemes in which they are embedded rather than from independently ascertainable 
'facts' to which they correspond. 
A well-established argument in support of this point derives from claims about the limits of 
language according to which the meaning of theoretical terms cannot be specified in a 
context-free manner because their sense depends on the way they are used within particular 
language-games (Wittgenstein, 1963). Moreover, any attempt to specify the conditions of use 
of a concept within a language-game runs up against the difficulty that this itself can only be 
formulated within a further language-game. A similar conclusion can also be reached through 
historical investigation of the progress of science. As Kuhn (1970) demonstrated, the social 
organization of science is a critical factor in explaining the changing acceptability of theories 
as these are negotiated within and between communities of scholars. The social support for 
the paradigms of normal science or for the revolutions which transform them cannot be 
reduced to the quality of fit between theory and predicate. 
An alternative critique of positivism derives from its old rival, philosophical idealism. Modern 
reformulations of this approach stand behind the  constructivist as compared to the realist  
position in the philosophy of science. Our categories of understanding precede and even 
produce the objects ofour experience. Moreover these categories are social products formed 
in the course of social interaction and not simply psychological givens. A final, charac-
teristically post-modern argument, has to do with the way theoretical insights are communica-
ted and received. The meaning of any communication depends on selective interpretation by 
which its numerous potential meanings are reduced. Whilst it is going too far to say that the 
reader decides the meaning of the text, it is certainly the case that there is nothing outside the 
text (Derrida,  1977) other than some other supplementary text. Therefore attention must be 
given to the way a text achieves its persuasive force and the metaphors and tropes it uses. Once 
again thisiapproach suggests that our theoretical conceptions are likely to reflect the conven-
tions ofour discourses rather than the structure of the world. Or, more carefully phrased, that 
this distinction only makes sense within distinct theoretical frameworks. 
If the philosophy and sociology of science has come to place ever greater stress on the 
importance of interpretative frameworks there has been a not dissimilar development in the 
philosophy and sociology of law. In Anglo-American philosophy of law, instead of describing 
law as a 'type of command' (Austin, 1955) or even a 'set of rules' (Hart, 1961), legal theorists 
now present law as a method of interpreting a community's social practices. For Dworkin, the 
meaning of law and the process of discovering that meaning cannot be distinguished (Dworkin, 
1986). There have been parallel developments within the sociology of law  (Nelken, 1986). 
Instead of explaining the interaction between 'law' and 'society'; or the 'correspondence' 
between types of law and social settings, attention has shifted to understanding law as a 
'medium of tradition' (Krygier, 1986) or a species ofdiscourse (Goodrich, 1986). Critical Legal 
Scholars likewise describe law as 'constitutive' of social relations (Gordon, 1984), as a way of 
seeing the world, not as a distinguishable aspect of it. From a different starting point, some 
continental sociologists of law have also emphasized the need to treat law as an epistemological 
subject in its own right, (Bourdieu 1986) with some calling for attention to be given to law's 
capacity to reproduce itself reflexively in the world of social communications (Luhmann 1988); 
Teubner, 1988; Nelken, 1988). 
It would be unwise to exaggerate the influence of these new approaches which co-exist with 
many positions in the philosophy and sociology of law which have not (yet) been reconceptua-
lized in post-positivist terms. But it is safe to conclude that there is now less certainty about 
the capacity of social science to understand law and more support for the idea that law has its 
own form of understanding the world. The implication for the problem of clashes between law 
and science is that post-positivist arguments appear to provide new grounds for resisting the 
force of scientific criticisms. Vittorio Villa, for example, has recently provided an extensive 
review of the way reigning conceptions of 'legal science' still rely on a positivisitic under -
standing of what counts as science and how scientific truths are established. Drawing on the 
alternative 'meta-theory' of science espoused by post-positivists he claims not only that 'legal 
science' is properly deserving of the name 'science', but also that philosophers of science have 
themselves seen the workings of law and legal reasoning as analogous to the processes by which 
scientific truth is accomplished (Villa 1984, 1988). For Gunther Teubner, on the other hand, 
the point to appreciate is that law is an 'epistemic subject' in its own right. As a result "there 
is no way to challenge the epistemic authority of law, neither by social realities themselves nor 
by common sense, nor by sociologically controlled observation" (Teubner, 1989 to p.35). But 
the conclusions which flow from post-positivist arguments are not univocal. Whilst Villa has 
shown the clear parallels between theory - construction in law and in science, it does not follow 
that law as a 'science' deals with the same questions which form the subject-matter of other 
sciences, with whose claims it sometimes appears to quarrel. Teubner, on the other hand, does 
see law as competing with other disciplines but offers a procedural solution to these conflicts. 
To clarify these points it will be necessary to provide a systematic account of the existing 
positions which are currently taken towards clashes between law and science and the new 
approachek which are now emerging. 
II Three ways of looking at clashes between law and science 
Disagreements between law and science may be considered from a scientific perspective, a 
legal perspective, or from some third position. These alternatives maybe entitled: the attempt 
to find 'the truth about law'; 'law's truth'; or finally, 'the truth about law's truth'. My main 
concern here is with the possibilities of developing the 'third position' and the meta-theoretical 
strategies this mayinvolve. I shall therefore offer selective accounts of the other tw(Yperspec-
lives geared mainly to showing how they lead us to the new set of questions involved in the 
search for a third position. For simplicity's sake I shall start from the assumption that both the 
legal and the scientific points of view rely on a positivist division of labour in which law is 
responsible for all normative tasks whilst science has authority over cognitive operations. I 
shall argue, in outline, that the differences in the points of view offered by law and science 
derive from the extent to which they understand their disagreements in cognitive or normative 
terms. Adopting a scientific perspective tends to lead to a scientific conception of law's role 
which favours scientific attempts at improvements. A legal interpretation, on the other hand, 
tends to 'make sense' of rules and practices with reference to an institutional normative 
framework which mayoften reveal scientific criticisms to be 'beside the poin t'. Given that both 
law and science, according to their 'concordat', recognize each other's authority outside their 
own jurisdiction, the usual solution to their disputes has depended on a marginal re-concep-
tualization or re-allocation of their mutual division of labour. The challenge posed by post-
positivist  arguments, however, lies in the way in which they have radically unsettled this division 
of labour, thereby opening up new sources of disagreement and, perhaps, also of solutions. 
The truth about law 
In keeping with the central influence of 'the idea of Science' since the Enlightenment, law 
increasingly came to be seen as one of those subjects to which the term could properly be 
applied. However, it has been during this century,especially in common-lawjurisdictions,that 
scientific and social scientific criticisms of law have reached their height and this movement 
has certainly not lost all its force. It would be pointless to make reference to the vast range of 
studies devoted to proving how certain legal rules of practices rest on mistaken pictures of the 
world or pursue instrumental goals in a way which a given scientific perspective deems to be 
misguided or ineffective. The important point for our purpose is that many of these critiques 
rely on a positivist conception of science as a superior, universal route to knowledge about and 
manipulation of the world as compared to the outmoded or imprecise guesswork embodied in 
the law. This viewpoint is well represented by Richard Posner, doyen of the Chicago school 
of 'Law and Economics', and now a Federal Court judge, in a recent address aptly entitled 'T'he 
decline of law' (Posner, 1987). For Posner, American lawyers will increasingly resort to 
scientific arguments before the Courts "as an irreversible consequence of the rise of prestige 
and authority of scientific and other exact modes of enquiry" (id. p.772). 
Generally speaking, from this point of view disagreements between law and science therefore 
serve mainly as opportunities to rationalize and update Law's factual presuppositions and 
regulative techniques. However, all this begs the fundamental question of how to tell whether 
a particular scientific perspective has succeeded in understanding the legal practice under 
  
criticism or has only turned the law into a pale (and inferior) imitation of itself (Samek, 
1974)[5]. The 'legal point of view' disappears because it is too easy to show that the ascribed 
goal or function which law is failing to serve would be better accomplished by the introduction 
of more scientific methods. To return to the controversy stirred by Posner's earlier work, it 
may perhaps be a more defensible position to argue that economics has something to contribute 
as a check on economic assumptions or predictions made by law instead of assuming that law 
is itself a form of economic reasoning (Veljanovski, 1985). But it is still a problem for 
economics to establish how far law is bound to adhere to economic methods. For it is hard for 
any scientific discipline to set limits to its own applicability. If we accept the appropriateness 
of psychological criticisms of the reliability of witness identifications in the criminal process, 
for example, why should we not accept other psychological studies whose arguments could 
bring us as far as replacing the accusatorial trial with a psychological tribunal? Yet this we are 
reluctant to do, even as we recognize the relevance of particular psychological criticisms. 
There are also other hidden problems involved in the importation of scientific approaches into 
law. Given the rivalry between scientific disciplines, and the conflicts between perspectives 
within them, we would often face the difficulty of knowing which to adopt. These disagree-
ments, on their face, often seem as serious as those between law and science and raise similar 
issue of commensurability. But law is potentially interested in the approaches of all these 
competing disciplines, even if it is incapable of choosing between them. In practice, of course, 
law tends to incorporate ideas and methods from disciplines with which it has shared values 
and methods, such as economics or ordinary-language philosophy, whilst dividing jurisdiction 
with less assimilable knowledges such as medicine or social work. But this does not reflect a 
theoretically coherent strategy for leaning about the world and it may reinforce law's 'blind 
spots' rather than compensate for them. For example, the 'methodological individualism' 
which is common to the Juridicial subject' of law, ordinary-language philsophy, and neo-clas-
sical economics excludes alternative accounts of the structural sources of social behaviour 
found in other disciplines. 
Law'struth 
These problems strengthen the case for welcoming a point of view in which the sense and 
validity of legal rules and procedures is made independent of external scientific criteria. In 
this optic law's concern is with the "institutional facts" (McCormick 1974) of the creation, 
maintenance and termination of normative rules rather than the 'brute facts' of the social and 
physical world. The connection between 'facts' and consequences is seen to pass through legal 
implications rather than 'cause and effect' and law may stipulate presumptions which are not 
recognized by science (Scoditti 1988). Above all, legal materials are to be interpreted in 
prescribed ways which bear on the normative  features of the facts, practices and conceptions 
 
in question, rather than their physical characteristics or their relevance in terms of social 
engineering. 
    
   
What more can be said about law's point of view? For obvious reasons it is hard for any scientific 
discipline to formulate this even though the social sciences for their part would claim to have 
much to say about the nature and achievement of law's normative functions as well as its 
instrumental ones. The nearest example of a self-limiting ordinance (which just stops short of 
incoherence) is perhaps to be found in the conclusion reached by Arthur Leff, one of the most 
original, if idiosyncratic, of American 1Law and Society' scholars. In a paper devoted to the 
relationship between law and external disciplines Leff wrote, "Ultimately law is not something 
that we know but something that we do" (Leff 1974 p.1011). In more positive terms, however, 
social scientists have also tried to describe the contours and constraints of law's point of view 
as compared to that of science. Law is seen as an institution which serves distinctive social 
functions as compared to science, and therefore develops in different ways. Law's ostensible 
functions of dispute-processing and legitimation of power-holders, for example, requires it to 
offer certainty and reinforce common-sense expectations whereas scientific progress depends 
on controversy and the undermining of common-sense. (Nelken 1987). The rationale of legal 
rules and principles under attack will therefore, in the first instance, be sought in considerations 
of authority, integrity, fairness, justice, acceptability, practicality and so forth which may have 
little or no application to science. Legal solutions will be deliberately geared to a particular 
time and place and to a specific community and its traditions.[6] Likewise law's methods of 
fact-gathering and fact-construction will be closely connected to the adjudicative process and 
to the problems of generating and maintaining the acceptance of those subject to legal rules. 
On this view some disagreements between law and science are to be attributed to straightfor-
ward confusion between 'institutional facts' and 'brute facts' or the difference between events 
in the world and their legal recognition and redefinition. Others will be interpreted in terms 
of such considerations as finality of decisions, the problems and requirements of doing justice 
on a case by case basis, or the moral and political aspects of normative regulation. Law, unlike 
science, has to use arbitrary cut-off points to define birth and death, the age of sexual maturity 
or criminal responsibility. Often it chooses not to look behind its presumptions. It will ignore 
the grey areas between its classifications, or its all-or-nothing adjudicative decisions, insofar as 
these are irrelevant to, or inconsistent with its tasks.[71 At times functional considerations may 
even conflict with its usual normative principles, as in the way English criminal law deems those 
under the influence of drink or drugs to be nevertheless capable of 'mens rea'. But this will 
not always be readily admitted precisely because it represents a potential contradiction within 
the 'institutional fact' system itself. 





     
     
     
     
     
The upshot of this functional account of law's specificity is that we should not expect law to 
parallel the internal workings or developments of science or be subject to the same tests of 
validity. When law calls upon science it does so in order to extend or defend its achievement 
of certainty, legitimacy and so on. Science can usefully serve as a source of expertise or 
experience which can attest to the reliability of certain classes of fact. When it suits law's 
purposes, science is treated as a yardstick of positivist certainties about the world. As Brian 
Wynne writes: 
"Whatever it is that sustains the fact-value distinction at the heart of the legal metaphysics it is 
not a well-developed explicit theory of science as a special esoteric form of rational knowledge". 
(Wynne, 1989, p.31). 
At other times, however, law or lawyers will have an interest in demonstrating the social 
contingencies of scientific claims to knowledge, such as the extent to which science treats value 
choices as technical problems.18j Acting as a sort of sociology of science, it may attack the 
social consensus which is required to sustain the status of particular sciences or scientists (Smith 
1989, Wynne 1989). In either case, law's conception of science tells us more about law than it 
does about science. 
But does this approach to law's point of view count as a method for grasping law's truth or only 
qualify as another attempt at a scientific description of 'the truth about law'? We can certainly 
find a similar functional understanding of law in works of legal theory.[91 But this only raises 
the further question of how far these works should be included in the 'law-object' of our 
theorizing (and how far law should be considered a single or unified discourse). A functionalist 
approach to legal discourse would suggest that legal statements gain their validity, at least in 
part, from the status and authority of those who pronounce them rather than, as in the scientific 
ideal, deriving their authority from their presumed closeness to the truth. But, paradoxically, 
this means that authoritative legal claims about law's functions can successfully compete with 
those asserted byunauthorized external sources. For example, if legal actors begin to describe 
their role as one of truth-seeking (and if they act on this description) the phenomenon itself 
changes. Thus, in a recent English civil case, a judge refused a lawyer's attempt to withhold 
documents from the court, and denyed that the civil procedure should be seen as a regulated 
game of conflict in which the judge served as an umpire: He insisted instead that the court was 
committed to learning all the truth so as to do justice (Jolowicz 1988).110] Whilst even the 
most authoritative legal statements can, of course, be shown to be legally mistaken, the issue 
here is whether a social scientific account of law's functions could be used to try to persuade 
the court that it really was involved in a game rather than the search for truth (in which case 
we might eventually see opposing lawyers employing their best accusatorial techniques in 
arguing whether legal procedures should be understood on the analogy of a game or of science!) 
12 
One of the most difficult tasks in grasping the legal point of view is to establish the character 
and degree of law's interest in what scientists mean by 'truth'. The self-understanding and 
development of a tradition, for example is by no means to be equated with the search for 
'historical truth'. According to most leading writers on the philosophy of law it is actually 
mistaken to look for the 'original intent' of these who frame legal directives, which instead 
must be interpreted as living materials to be reconceptualized under changing conditions. But 
the problem is most acute in seeking to make sense of legal procedures. Thus Damaska (1986) 
argues that Anglo-American rules of criminal procedure give a lower priority to the attainment 
oftruththatiContinentallnquisitorialsystemsoffact-finding.11lJ But it is unclearhowfar this 
should be seen as truth being deliberately compromised in favour of other values such as 
fairness or legitimacy or whether we should rather say that what truth means  for law is the result 
of the application of ire own professes. in other words, is law's vardstick of correctness and 
correctnes!?' and justice the result of a more or of a less demanding conception 
of truth than that used by science? To the extent that scientific conceptions 
of value-free facts and the methods of obtaining them are historically and 
culturally specific we should not be surprised to find law adopting distinct-ive 
forms of truth-finding in other times and places (Geertz, 1.983). Establishing 
the truth of events nay, for example, depend on finding people with the 
appropriate reputation and authority to bear witness concerning the character 
of the offender rather than on discovering witnesses to the event. 
On the other hand, it would be wrong to contrast law's interest and standards 
of truth too greatly with those we now associate with science. e12) The 
weaknesses of such art approach to 'law's truth' are precisely the strong points 
of the previous perspective of  Lite  'truth about law' discussed earlier. Thus  Sorokin  saw law as a form of  proto-sociology, because its classifications of 
Property and contract relations helped provide the impetus for Wrlcheim's two 
types of social solidarity. Likewise, the functionalist account of the way 
law's practical purposes condition its interest in truth should not blind us to 
the extent to which current legal argumentation does strive for adequacy also 
in terms of scientific criteria of truth. The distinctions supposedly 
constituting the legal point of view such as that between the 'cognitive' and 
the 'normative' (cf.  Luhmann, 1988).. 	 - . 
or 'principle' and 'policy' (cf. Dworkin, 
1986) are at most matters of emphasis rather than absolute contrasts. Ronald Dworkin, in his 
philosophy of law, or Niklas Luhmann, in his sociology of law, both warn of the dangers which 
flow from judges basing their decisions on policy-calculations and the risks of linking law's 
validity to die instrumental success of its decisions. But, insofar as these dangers are real, they 
testify to the incompleteness of their own accounts of legal phenomena. 
The process which German scholars describe as 'the materialization of law' certainly means 
that if we restrict our attention to law's normative and symbolic aspects we would belittle the 
various ways it also takes an interest in predicting And manipulating social reality. The 
justification of legal judgements can better be read, as Robert Summers argues, as a mixture 
of 'righiness'reasons and 'goal-oriented' reasons. (Summers 1978) Max Weber's ideal-types 
of formal and substantive rationality were designed to allow us to examine just how far law 
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becomes implicated in schemes of social engineering or wealth redistribution, and the degree 
to which its reasoning processes reached out beyond itself. Legal discourse must therefore be 
seen as part and parcel of wider cultural movements and changing intellectual fashions. At 
least some of the conceptions and practices which may be criticized from the point of view of 
other disciplines will have found their way into law as a result of previously accepted but 
superseeded versions of those same sciences. And, in current practice, other disciplinary 
perspectives are introduced into law via law reform, expert evidence or 'judicial notice'. It is 
these points which provide the justification for those perspectives which seek to show the 'truth 
about law'. Moreover, the application of these perspectives is self-fulfilling insofar as they 
become part of legal argument. Yet, by the same token, if we move too far in this direction we 
risk obscuring or destroying what is special about 'law's truth'. 
III The truth about law's truth 
The approaches examined so far argue that law may sometimes be misinterpreted by science, 
and that science, in its turn, can be misinterpreted by law. Taken together they suggest that 
disagreements between law and science are largely a result of these mutual misunderstandings. 
If the legal and the scientific points of view were to be properly applied to their appropriate 
subject-matters then the reasons for dispute should be removed. This assumes that we are able 
to tell what belongs to the respective domain of law and of science. But it is confidence in this 
regard which is being undermined by attacks on positivist positions in law and science. This 
puts on the agenda the search for a 'third position' which could indicate when law's assumptions 
and methods should be defended even when apparentlyin genuine conflict with science. And 
behind this search there there often seems to lie the hope that law may be used in some way 
as a means to control the growing power of expertise. 
The difficulties of finding a third position may be considered under three headings. These 
concern the possibility and desirability of producing a new division of labour between law and 
science, the question whether legal and scientific arguments are commensurable or should be 
made to be#, and 'above all' the problem whether there is a meta-theory from which it could be 
possible to understand or adjudicate between law and science. In crude terms the issues are 
as follows. Is it still possible to draw a line between law and science? Where should the line 
be drawn? Who should draw it? As will readily be appreciated an answer to any one of these 
questions implies a position on the others. For example if, like Luhmann (1982), we consider 
it important to avoid 'functional de-differentiation' at all costs, we will try to reconstruct a new 
division of labour for post-modernity. We will then be obliged to justify the position which lies 
behind our choice. Conversly, if we are convinced that legal and scientific arguments are 
commensurable we will need to demonstrate why this is the case. 
The new division of labour 
Under the impact of post-positivist arguments it seems as if scientists can no longer go into 
battle with law as in the past carrying the banner of truth (Smith 1981). Some legal commen-
tators have taken this as a warrant to remove any special obligation on law to accept scientific 
criticisms of the legal process. Peter Tillers, for example, spends some ninety closely argued 
pages considering the applicability of standard statistical techniques to legal methods of fact 
finding only to reach the following conclusion: 
"Although we have good reason to worry about the accuracy of fact-finding procedures we 
should also recognize the great difficulty we have in deciding that one or other vision of the 
world is superior t6 opposing visions ... (therefore) we should look for types of justification and 
judicial processes which best reflect faithfully the vision of man and nature to which our society 
is committed". (Tillers, 1983 p.1094). 
Similarly, Fineman and Opie in criticizing the use of psychological findings on child rearing 
argued that "no one can legitimately claim to deserve more credibility because his or her 
arguments are based on abstract truth" (Fineman and Opie 1987 p.156). Although we must 
be careful in interpreting these writers their argument appears to be that the rights and wrongs 
of particular procedures cannot be distinguished from assertions about their accuracy. What 
is less clear is whether their arguments are designed either to bolster law's mastery of its own 
normative domain or else to mark the collapse of clear jurisdictional boundaries inasmuch as 
law and science may now disagree on both cognitive and normative dimensions.[ 131 On 
balance, writers who are interested in finding a new division of labour can still find support in 
philosophical, sociological or semiotic theories of the distinctiveness of law. These may rely 
on or reformulate established distinctions between law making and law application, rule-inter -
pretation and fact-finding the roles of lawyers and parties, of judges, experts and juries, or the 
procedures considered appropriate at different stages of the criminal or civil process. Parado-
xically, law and science may help maintain a continuing division of labour insofar as it may suit 
each of them to treat the other as if they were still to be understood in positivist terms, whatever 
the extent of their changing post-positivist understanding of their own position. In this way the 
'other' becomes the necessary but potentially dangerous "supplement"  (Derrida 1977, Fitzpa-
trick, 1983) which helps maintain their distinctive identity. For the foreseeable future there-
fore we may expect law and science to continue to be distingished on the basis of some residual 
contrast between the cognitive and the normative realms, with this distinction being denied 
only under special conditions. 
The problem of commensurability 
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As long as law and science do present themselves as different the problem of commensurability 
arises. This issue has a number of aspects. How far can claims in one discourse be translated 
without loss of meaning into another discourse? What is the difference between incommen-
surabilityand incompatibility? What similarities and dissimilarities are there between clashes 
within science and within law? At the practical level, how far should we try to make statements 
and discourses more compatible and how much should we cherish their plurality? (Twining 
1983). 
In the positivist scheme of things the impossibility of embracing legal and scientific claims in 
the same theoretical language represented both the problem and suggested its own solution, 
in the form of the conventional division of labour between facts and values.[14] But post-po-
sitivist arguments tend to see more similarity between law and science, to the extent that the 
positivist programme for the sciences comes to seem (paradoxically) little more than a 
normative  set of prescriptions for science to follow. For Foucault for example, social science 
in particular has an interest in regulating the world not merelyin understanding it. Indeed the 
disciplinary regimes it operates and inquisitorial procedures it follows are inseparable from 
the knowledge it produces. So there is less contrast between the projects of discovering "the 
truth about law" and interpreting 'laws truth" than either is willing to acknowledge. Each 
achieves its "truth effects" within guiding paradigms, each depends on community support and 
imposes arbitrary 'closure' at a certain stage of discussion so as to move on to the next problem. 
Recent efforts to tackle the question of commensurability tend to focus on the different types 
of claim that are made within and across discourses exposing the criteria for success which are 
linked to the audiences for which the communications are intended. We learn from speech-act 
theory, for example, that statements may be classified as assertive, evaluative, prescriptive, 
performative, etc. The problem of commensurability then becomes that of the relation 
between these types of statements. Many authors are willing to 
characterise science as containing a preponderance of assertive statements whilst law specia-
lizes in evaluative and performative ones (Samek 1974, , Jackson 1988,Alexy 1989). But some 
social scientists would deny even this. In a recent review of the implications of post-positivist 
arguments for the social sciences, Theoder Gergen, a social psychologist, concluded: "Social 
science statements at least should also be seen as performative rather than descriptive, serving 
to express alternative visions desinged to bring about change" (Gergen, 1986, p.152). On this 
view the commensurability of law and science as performative visions of the world might open 
up new possibilities for competition inasmuch as each discourse held out different political and 
moral assessments of a plausible and worthwhile future. It could be said that the American 
Critical Legal Studies Movement is engaged in just such an exercise (Stanford Law Review 
1984). 
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For most legal theorists however the problem of commensurability lies altogether elsewhere. 
The crucial contrast for them is that between the 'internal' and the 'external' point of view. 
Indeed this has often been taken to be the key to resolving all of the issues surrounding the 
actual and ideal relationship between law and other disciplines.[ 15] On the one hand, com-
mentators worried about the narrowness of law's internal point of view have argued for a 
'broadening of perspectives from within' in which law would become more aware of the other 
points of view bearing on its practices. Others, from Kelsen to Dworkin, have sought to protect 
what they see as the integrity of law's internal point of view. 
It is worth spending some time on Dworkin's discussion of this question which he obviously 
considers central to his project. Focussing on the judicial role Dworkin attempts to use the 
distinction to explain the incommensurability of law and external disciplines. An external 
point of view , he argues, can explain "Why certain patterns of legal argument develop in some 
periods or circumstances rather than others,-for example". But what they cannot do is help 
judicial decision-making as such. This is because judges, ".... do not want predictions of what 
claims they will make, but arguments about which of these claims is sound and why; they want 
theories not about how history and economics have shaped their consciousness but about the 
place of these disciplines in argument about what the law requires them to do or have". 
(Dworkin, 1986, p.13, my emphasis).[161 
There are a number of over-simplifications in Dworkin's account of the role of external 
disciplines in this passage. His assumptions that they are predictive rather than hermeneutic, 
or concerned with explanation rather than evaluation, seem designed only to sharpen the 
contrast with law 'as an interpretative discipline'. Whilst it may be convenient to define the 
social sciences in such positivist language even whilst attacking positivist conceptions of law, 
this takes no account of the arguments within social science between advocates of external 
explanation and internal understanding. Dworkin's approach to the 'internal point' of view is 
shared to some extent even by writers otherwise critical of the distinction, such as Andre 
Arnaud, who admits, in his vivid phraseology, that it is 'impossible to be in the scene and on 
the balcony' at the same time. On the other hand, other legal theorists, such as Sheldon Leader 
in his paper on 'The Limits of the Internal Point of View' (Leader, 1985), argue that this too 
is a non-issue.  The judge, for Leader, "is not suspended between external and internal 
perspectives trying to decide how he should move and looking at predictions of how he should 
move" (Leader, id., p.177). Rather he has a reason to turn to such external perspectives where 
necessary so as to provide himself with the opportunity to reflect on what he is doing and learn 
to recognize the types of interest or argument he typically finds most persuasive. He can then 
reconsider whether he is right to grant them such importance. Even Dworkin appears to 
concede this point when he admits that external disciplines can provide judges with theories 
about how their consciousness has been shaped. What they cannot do, he insists, is help 
determine which legal arguments are sound. For that we need "a theory of the place of these 
disciplines in legitl argument". But thUoint here is that Dworkin himself never provides us  
with such a theory. This could be because his approach is so close to the legal point of view 
that he only succeeds in echoing its reluctance to see die force of insights coming from other 
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disciplines except when they are couched as legal arguments, by which time they have lost their 
distinctiveness.[ 171 
What this suggests is that instead of seeing the internal - external 
distinction as the clue to the problem of commensurability we should rather see 
it as a contrast internal to the legal point of view itself. Social scientists 
have less trouble in accommodating the tasks of explanation and comprehension, 
for example by adopting the 'moderate external point of view designed to take 
account of the internal point of view of those following a given social 
practice (Ost and Van de Kerchove, 1987). The reason that some legal theorists 
reject this Weberian compromise is because such an approach would not serve 
law's purposes. The internal - external contrast for law is not a matter of 
harmonizing different perspectives but of expressing the existential situation 
and phenomenological attitude of actors within the legal system. It may be 
argued that law's hesitation about recommending the perspective of the 'virtual 
participant' has little to do with its incapacity to illuminate its practices 
and everything to do with the need to ensure that legal actors follow 
consensually agreed internal methods of interpretation so as Lo avoid 
unorthodox and unpredictable innovations in tradition. There is also another 
way of putting this point. From law's point of view it is science which 
represents the potentially threatening 'external' perspective. But for science 
itself the same could be said of law. In practice. the internal-external 
distinction is less likely to be the framework science uses to understand its 
own boundary disputes since it is relatively less concerned than law with 
censoring innovation. But, strictly speaking, the relationship between law and 
other disciplines would have to be modelled as that between two internal points 
of view. If this is correct the problem that really confronts us is how to find 
a metatheoretical point of observation from which the relationship between 
these two internal points of view can be constructed. 
IV The Search for a Meta-theory i  
This brings us to the crux questions raised by this enquiry. Can there be a 
third point of view on disputes between law and science? What form would it 
take? Is it more a matter of searching for a new or synthetic perspective or is 
it rather a question of prescribing guidelines for good decision-making 
practice when such clashes arise? We have seen so far that not all questions 
about law are legal questions but that both law and science may compete in 
saying what is a legal question. 0187 Can there be anything more to say on this 
matter which is not already couched either in terms of trying to reach a 
greater understanding of the nature of these disputes or developing a better 
method of deciding what to do about them? Is there any way in which such 
discussions (including this one) can actually stand outside the debate they 
attempt to transcend and avoid competing with the approaches they seek to 
understand or evaluate? The attempt to answer these questions involves the 
difficult search for a meta-theory of law, science and their relationship. 0191 
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There are certainly many excellent studies which offer an account of the rise and fall of 
particular types of knowledge and power and the conflicts between them (See e.g. works by 
Foucault (1977), Atiyah(1979), Smith (198 1) r. 	Garland (198.5). These can tell us a great 
deal about the reasons for the changing fortunes of different discourses but they are usually 
the first to admit the difficulty of deriving object lessons from these clashes (See e.g. Smith 
1981). On the other hand more normative approaches tend to marginalize the question of 
truth, to the extent that some writers see legal decision-making as distinctively engaged in 
handling 'practical' choices to which no theoretical 'right answers' can be discovered, as 
compared to what can be achieved in the realm of 'speculative disagreements'. (McCormick 
1978). 
Both these approaches therefore avoid attempting to provide a meta-theory. But there are 
some writers who do try to tackle this problem directly. Three responses can be distinguished. 
The first, which I shall call the reconstructive approach, looks for meta-theoretical answers in 
realms beyond the institutionalized discourses of law and science. Its problem is how to 
maintain this view-point in the face of post-positivist challenges to transcendent truth-claims. 
The second approach, following post-modern movements such as 'the turn to deconstruction' 
rejects the possibilityofdiscovering Toundationalist'certain ties. [201 But it has to confront the 
obvious dangers of self-contradiction in proving its case. The third approach, which I shall call 
the 'dialogic' respon se is the one with which I shall be particularly concerned. It reacts to the 
weaknesses of the other two approaches by determining to find the answer from science and 
law rather than elsewhere.' It then has to grapple with the difficulties that 
are entailed in asking discourses to transcend themselves. 
All three of these strategies draw on various strands of post-positivist 
arguments. They accept many of the critiques of 'correspondence' theories of: 
truth but they differ in the implications they derive from consensus theory or 
coherence theory. Although some writers have tried to combine different 
elements of these strategies (See e.g. Hutchinson 1988) it will be more useful 
here to outline them in their ideal-typical forms so as to get a clearer 
picture of their strengths and weaknesses. 
The reconstructive response makes of the search for a valid meta-theory almost 
an end in itself, a search which maintains its momentum by showing the 
impossibility of abandoning it. Thus we meet arguments about- the need to be 
'sceptical about scepticism', the impossibility of engaging in rational 
discussion without endorsing the value of truth, and the requirement of 
applying to our own arguments the criteria we apply to others. (Finnic, 1978; 
Brownsword and Beleveyld, 1986; Alexy, 1989). The goals of this search may be 
various. For some writers the aim is to interpret or recapture a transcendent-
source of truth and value (Finnis, 1978;  Habermas, 19791. At the other exLreme 
some thinkers recommend looking for a consensus at a more concrete and 
practical level (Waldron, 1987). 21] 
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The broader 'master' discourses to which law and science are usually referred by those 
following this approach include religion, morality, politics, philosophy, 'practical reason' and 
common sense. Such discourses often lie at the root of the "will to truth" within law and science, 
as Neitzche and Foucault have argued. It is therefore not surprising that they are again invoked 
when law and science find themselves facing ultimate questions or at least the difficulty of 
resolving questions ultimately. The form that any such meta-theory takes will Ihen depend on 
the type of argumentation and practice characteristic of the master discourse chosen, whether 
it be, for example the analytical techniques of philosophy, the revealed or rational truths and 
value - judgements of religion or morality, or the pragmatic case by case appraisals of 'practical 
reason'. 
The second, deconstructive strategy, on the other hand, focusses on the limits and interdiscur-
sivities of all arguments and 'texts'. Certainty is corroded by the endless play of 'signifier' and 
'signified' and truth itself becomes an "army of metaphors" at the command of "the will to 
power", This approach maintains its momentum in various ways. It undermines pretensions 
to 'totalizing' visions (Lyotard 1984); opens up attempts by legal and other texts to achieve 
'closure' (I)errida,1977; Stanford Law Review 1984); anticipates criticisms by self criticism 
(Kramer forthcoming) and ironicises all claims to truth including its own (Kennedy 1985). 
Some writers who follow this strategy justify their position by rejecting 'scientific' method in 
the name of hermeneutics. Law, history and even science are all seen to presuppose the 
internal grasping and application of a tradition. But the results obtained in this way are 
necessarily contingent to a given period and place. G adamer, for example, rejects the possibi-
lity of a ilabermasian "ideal-speech situation" because our conceptions of what would bring us 
closer to it are always necessarily formulated according to prevailing cultural assumptions 
within a given community. Rorty, in a series of attacks on what he terms Toundationalism', 
counterposes the hermeneutic and epistemological projects, arging that the search for episte-
mological certainty must and should give way to a concern to appreciate the diversity of 
discourses (Rorty 1979). Rather than attempting to offer a superior, contextualised explana-
tion of discourses (what I have categorized here as 'the truth about law' and which is explicity 
described in Britain as putting the 'law in context') the crucial task is to find ways of keeping 
the conversation between discourses going. 
Those who argue for a deconstructive strategy tend to say that they are trying to get away from 
talking about truth, rather than showing its impossibility.[221 The nearest they come to 
asserting a strong thesis concerning the pointlessness of looking for a meta-theory comes in 
arguments derived from Kuhn and Wittgenstein on the limits to our ability to predict how 
discourses change. As Rortyputs it; 
"The product of abnormal discourse can be anything from nonsense to intellectual revolution 
and there is no discipline which describes it" (Rorty 1979 p.320) Wittgenstein's notion of 
'language games' and the 'forms of life' in which they are embodied has been particularly 
influential. As one of his leading commentators explains: 
"The most common form of philosophical nonsense arises when (a words is used in a langua-
ge-game other than the one appropriate to it" (Kenny 1973, p.164-5). 
Kenny goes straight on to show why Wittgenstein's ideas cannot be exploited in order to draw 
borderlines between different discourses in terms of 'appropriateness'. 
"So it is clearly important to be able to know where one language game ends and another begins. 
How does one do this? Wittgenstein gives us little help here". (Kenny id. p.165) Whilst it 
would be helpful to be able to distinguish cases of illegitimate crossing between language games 
from cases of genuine overlap any effort to do so in a general manner becomes just another 
language-game. And this applies also to the use of the expression 'language-game' itself. 
A somewhat neglected application of Wittgenstein's ideas by Robert Samek, designed to 
elucidate what he calls the 'legal point of view', provides a good illustration of their implications 
for meta-theory.(Samek 1974). According to him, points of view can only be correct or 
incorrect by virtue of their own criteria. Our meta-views on these points of view therefore are 
neither true nor false but are only evaluations of a given point of view from a particular 
standpoint. Samek claims that the functions of different discourses may cross-cut the point of 
view to which they belong and that it is our understanding of a point of view rather than the 
point of view itself which maps our field of interest. The upshot of this is the stringent limits 
on examining one language game from the vantage point of another. For example: "the 
distinction between the evaluative and the assertive function of discourse is fruitful when it is 
used as part of an outward-looking model; when it is turned inwards and used reflexively it 
loses its thrust and becomes paradoxical" (Samek ibid.p.324). 
Both the reconstructive route map for finding a meta-theory and the  deconstructivist warnings 
against even setting out on the journey have their special drawbacks. The difficulty the 
constructivists face is how to avoid their resort to master disciplines from needing to be again 
reformulated in the discourses of either law or science. If answers are sought in the discourses 
of morality or practical reason, for example, it soon transpires that asking these approaches to 
provide solutions on a case by case basis reproduces something very like the procedures and 
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principles of law and therefore cannot provide any purchase for disposing of scientific challen-
ges. Should we, on the other hand, decide that the answer to a clash is ultimately political, for 
example, we will be hard put to explain what we mean without embarking on a scientific enquiry 
into the meanings and effects of different ways of defining the political. Are we talking of the 
political sphere or of political science? Is politics to be distinguished from law and science in 
terms of its institutions, its functions or its characteristic discourse? Isthekeypointthatchoices 
between law and science are inherently matters of policy rather than principle? Or is it the 
need to involve ordinary people, either through representative institutions or in participatory 
institutions such as the jury? Even this does not exhaust the possible meaning of describing 
these choices as political. For some writers, for example, this could be merely a coded way of 
saying that what we have here are the sort of problems which lies beyond the reach of theoretical 
argument and are necessarily a matter of subjective evaluation or brute struggles for power. 
In the unlikely event that master-discourses could provide their own unequivocal self-descrip-
tions and that these could be brought to bear on clashes between law and science a number of 
further questions arise. At what point is it appropriate to resort to other discourses and which 
discourse should be used to decide this? A large part of legal discourse (and not merely that 
entitled constitutional law), for example, is concerned with the question of the relationship 
between law and politics. Following this path would subordinate master-discourses to the 
decision rules of law. But there is no reason to assume that the political sphere or political 
discourse would define its relevance to law in the same way as law itself. Science and law may 
agree or disagree about the right point at which to turn to master discourses, or may have then) 
imposed by fiat. In turn master discourses may speak without being asked or heard. 
These unresolved problems of the reconstructive approach mark even the most subtle efforts 
to draw on broader discourses to clarify "the truth about law's truth". This can be seen in the 
classic study 'Causation in the Law', in which Hart and Honor! examined the relationship 
between legal and scientific conceptions of causation. (Hart and Honor!), 1959/1985). They 
argued that law's understanding of the term was and should be derived from ordinary, 
common-sense language. Illustrating their approach by a study of judicial case-law on the 
meaning of causation in the areas of tort and criminal law they insisted that this was not to be 
explained by reference to scientific criteria or the attempt to arrive at ,policy-based appropriate 
allocations of responsibility. Laws' view of causation, for instance its distinction be twee it cause 
and 'mere condition' as depending on the intervention of a responsible human agent, was 
intended to reproduce the sense of the term in ordinary speech. Thus the yardstick by which 
law's solutions fell to be assessed in cases of scientific challenge was its fidelity to the morally 
laden common-sense use of language in the attribution of responsibility. Although the authors 
included an analysis of the approach to causation in continental jurisprudence, which they felt 
was not inconsistent with their argument, it is clear that their remarks have most plausibility 
when applied to Anglo-American judgements which do tend to place store on alleged links to 
common-sense.[23] But there are important criticisms to be made even in the latter context. 
Many would argue, for instance, that their theory is descriptively inaccurate. Judges do not 
conduct a careful analysis of the way words are used, and, more importantly, the authors own 
claims regarding normal usage can often be faulted (Martin 1987) Common-sense in the courts 
and in ordinary language philosophy is easily mistaken for much more local usage amongst 
professors. In addition, whatever law and common sense have in common may owe as much 
to the influence of legal ideas of responsibility in shaping common sense as vice-versa.  
(Lloyd-Bostock 1978; 1979) 
The critical issue for our purposes, however, concerns the reasons why Hart and Honor! think 
law must and should follow common sense. Although this meta-level question was somewhat 
neglected in their original work, in response to criticisms of their first edition the preface to 
the second edition attempted to deal with this point. It offered a political argument asserting 
the advantages to be gained if law reinforced everyday beliefs in personal responsibility, 
whatever their current scientific status, because this would help encourage responsible beha-
viour. But this is a claim which would need to be tested scientifically. Nor does it exclude the 
possibility that for other purposes closer adherence to scientific conceptions would be more 
appropriate. As Martin puts it: 
"There would be no reason, a priori, that a legal expert ought not to use scientific notions of 
cause in certain contexts. It would depend on whether certain policy considerations were 
furthered by the use of such notions "(Martin 1987 p.113). Without necessarily endorsing the 
claim that, pace Hart and Honor!, policy must always provide the ultimate level or meta-theory 
by which law must be guided, Martin's criticisms do sow doubts over the success of their attempt 
to present law as a form of common sense beyond the reach of scientific or policy considera-
tions. 
A more recent study which tries to place law within the bounds of a larger discourse is that by 
Robert Alexy who offers a systematic case for law as a specialized part of 'practical reason' 
[Alexy 1989]. Drawing on the ideas of Perelman, Habermas and the Erlangen school, Alexy 
claims that law can be rational to the extent that it adopts the rules and canons of his ideal 
version of practical argumentation. Describing his work as a 'meta-discourse' on the criteria 
for rationality in legal argument, he carefully spells out the implications of his belief that both 
factual assertions and value-judgements must each be tested against the criterion of the 
relevant 'best informed opinion'. 
But this approach does not really take us very far in resolving our problem of potential clashes 
between law and science. Alexy has some sympathy with J.L. Austin's definition of truth as 
"the right and proper thing to say in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes, 
with these intentions" (Alexy id. p.56-57). He concedes that law includes a variety of types of 
statement and that "at any time [law] can make a transition into theoretical (empirical) 
discourse". (Alexy id. p.233) Whilst accepting that normative statements cannot be tested by 
the methods of the empirical sciences he leaves it "for further investigation whether normative 
arguments are true in exactly the same way as empirical ones".(id.p.178). Alexydoes not deny 
the importance of our problem given that "the relevance of introducing empirical knowledge 
of legal reasoning can hardly be overstated" (id p.233). But the task of specifying the rules for 
assessing such relevance in cases of uncertainty was too great: 
"A thoroughgoing theory of empirical reasoning relevant to legal justification would have to 
deal with almost all the problems of <)nitiing empirical knowledge. Added to this are the 
problems of incorporating empirical knowledge into legal reasoning". In the meantime "this 
problem is only to be resolved by way of interdisciplinary co-operation" (Alexy id,p.233) As 
we have seen, however, the question of the terms on which such co-operation should proceed 
is exactly the issue which needs to be solved. 
Both the reconstructive and deconstructive approaches will continue to find 
adherents (corresponding very roughly to those drawn to the modern and 
postmodern strands in contemporary culture). But their difficulties provide an 
incentive to those struggling with the prospect of a third approach. ']'his third 
strategy, which 1 kw3L  tei,i"] 'dialogic', takes some points from each of the 
previous strategies, despite their apparent irreconcilability, and therefore 
ends up resembling neither. Like the reconstructive approach it continues the 
search for a positive way forward. But in common with the deconstructive. 
approach it rejects the possibility of finding any master discourse capable of 
pitting law and science in their proper places. Any progress that is to he made 
has to come from within law and science themselves. The dialogic strategy 
therefore seeks to juxtapose different perspectives as a spur to their 
self-transformation and its momentum is maintained by the dialectic of mutual 
interrogation. In ways which resemble calls to religious inter-faith dialogue 
it calls for reciprocal understanding amongst different perspectives on the 
presupposition that none can or should relingui.sh their special viewpoints. The 
test of success is the degree to which each approach can recognize itself in 
the image of it held by the other. As this outline makes clear, however, the 
problem which confronts this approach is built into its starting premise. If 
perspectives must remain true to themselves how can they also hope to 
understand the other? 
The difficulties of the third approach are well set out by Alberto Febbrajo in 
the course of a review of the recent revival of the application of 'systems 
theories' to law, which have been very influential in stimulating discussion of 
these problems. Febbrajo poses the basic problem in a way which will by now be 
familiat How, he asks, can we "establish the degree of cognition and reflection 
that law can from time to time allow itself, without betraying its identity and 
turning itself into a different instrument of social control" (Febbrajo 1988 
p.7). Assuming that the answer must involve a search for a meta-system  L  241 he 
wonders: 
If the constructivist is tempted to travel hopefully rather than arrive, the deconstructivist, for 
his part, finds it hard to insist that he is not going anywhere. Rorty insists that there can be no 
'philosophical Archimedian point' but even he writes of the possibility that the conversation 
amongst d5scourses may lead them to somehow transcend their limitations. Attempts to be 
consistently ironic also have difficulty in keeping this up. As Frankenburg puts it in his 
summary of a recent piece in this vein by David Kennedy: 
"However much Kennedy wishes to get away from truth-claims, he is still constantly and 
implicitly asserting the truthfulness of his narrative and the authenticity of the narrator" 
(Frankenberg 1989 p.396). Even with a reverse momentum,"the postmodern skeptic, guarded 
by irony and advancing with all nondeliberate speed, seems unable to outrun modernity". 
(Frankenberg id.p.397). 
"What rneta-system could guarantee a mutual understanding (intersubjectivity) of the different 
criteria for attention, interpretation and manipulation applied by each system?"(id.p.13). For 
Febbrajo the way the forward in understanding the relationship between 'internal' and 'exter-
nal' legal culture requires "a mutual translation of the symbolic universes of both cultures". But 
in the light of post-positivist claims concerning the mutual embeddedness of cognitive and 
normative arguments, any such undertaking faces "the impossibility of establishing where one 
communicative channel ends, where another begins, and which of the two is tributary"(id.p.13) 
Despite all these obstacles, however, Febbrajo remains committed to finding a way to ensure 
"the successful reproduction of the normative-cognitive flow of information between law and 
society"(id.) although he does not specify how this should be done. To see what others have 
said about the manner in which this could be achieved, and their criterion of success, I shall 
now consider in some detail recent attempts to pursue the third strategy and overcome its 
difficulties. 
V The Loneliness of Law's Meta-theory 
In order to make sense of the various efforts to find 'the truth about law's truth' which draw 
exclusively on science or law it may be helpful to place them along a continuum. At one end 
are those arguments which try to show why science can help us deal with this question without 
reproducing the difficulties of approaches merely committed to explaining 'the truth about 
law'. At the other extreme we can place claims that the correct interpretation of 'law's truth' 
will also tell us what to do when law and science conflict. Towards the middle of this continuum 
are those approaches which offer the fullest accounts of how to operate a dialogic strategy in 
which both law and science are given their say. 
These approaches each cope with the meta-theoretical issue in characteristic ways. Whereas 
the more scientific standpoints try to show how the reflexivity of science can even allow it to 
understand its own limitations the more legalistic approaches show how law's self-under-
standing, suitably encouraged, can find some place for all the relevant implications of external 
approaches. The positions towards the centre try to harness both of these reflexive strategies. 
By paying close attention to the arguments offered in support of these different positions we 
will be able to learn how successfully they deal with the problem of clashes between law and 
science. 
I shall begin with an example at the 'scientific' end of the spectrum. In his recent review of the 
field of sociology of law Roger Cotterrell admits at the outset that the new agenda which it 
must confront is the difficulty of comparing fields of intellectual endeavour because "each 
constructs its own fields of knowledge and experience" (Cotterrell 1986 p.1 1). Henevertheless 
finds an ingenious argument to show why sociology can still provide a privileged route to 
understanding law. This is that, uniquely, sociology is dedicated to a reflexive perspective on 
the development of disciplines - including itself. Law, by contrast, lacking this interest, is no 
more than$ a 'discipline-effect', whose changing knowledge-claims can therefore be best 
illuminated through the use of sociology (of science and knowledge). The post-positivist twist 
in his argument is that a 'scientific' perspective on law is here credited with a superior 
epistemology not because of its greater capacity for getting at 'the facts about the world' but 
precisely on the basis of its more sophisticated sense of the limits of disciplinary understanding. 
Cotterrell sees law's tendency to import the methods and findings of external disciplines as a 
sign of periodic crises which reveal its recognition of its disciplinary weakness and the need to 
resort to other perspectives in order to correct the mistaken assumptions and fictions which 
disfigure it. 
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But can this argument provide the meta-theorywe are looking for? In the first place it should 
be noted that insofar as sociology is being put forward as the discipline capable of rising above 
"competing fields of knowledge and experience" this is because law's disciplinary status has 
already been downgraded  so that it does not represent real competition. There is some support 
for Cotterrell's view of law in the work of writers such as Kuhn, Rorty and Foucault, all of whom 
are unsure whether legal science qualifies as a 'paradigm', 'normal science', or "episteme". But 
this does not meet the point that law sees itself as a self- sufficient interpretative framework, 
as Dworkin amongst others would argue. If it is said that Dworkin's views are too closely 
identified with those of law itself, it may fairly be said that Cotterrell for his part stands too 
close to sociology to be able to furnish 'the truth of law's truth'. 
Another way of putting this point is to recognize that even when seeking to describe its own 
limitations a sociological perspective cannot really transcend its own style and method of 
argument. Thus we find that sociological approaches to clashes between disciplines typically 
offer either  functionalist explanations of the appropriate role of different disciplines or a 
conflict-oriented account of the sources of their rivalry. But this means that other disciplinary 
perspectives will offer alternative meta-theories which compete with that put forward by 
sociology. A psychological meta-theory, for example, would concentrate on the psychological 
aspects of disagreement between discourses and an economic approach would point to the 
importance of costs and benefits of the choices between different disciplines. Both of these 
meta-theories could also then be applied to explain their own evolution. Moreover law too can 
put forward a reflexive understanding of its own genesis and applicability which can enter into 
conflict with any alternatives. it does not have to work in the same way as social science to 
represent an epistemological equal. Whilst Cotterrell therefore claims too much for sociology 
(or any scientific approach) he is surely right to highlight the particular appropriateness of the 
sociology of knowledge for discussing the contests between disciplines since it is hard not to 
draw on this approach even for criticising his arguments! 
However, we may now move on to consider the less imperialistic social scientific approach to 
our problem which is found in the work of Francis Ost and Michael van de Kerchove. Building 
on a continuing theme of their work, one of their recent texts directly addresses the problem 
of developing a critical perspective on interdisciplinarity and law. What they offer may fairly 
be described as a mainstream moderate social science viewpoint on the question  (Ost and van 
de Kerchove 1987). These authors admit that it is impossible to provide anything like an 
'absolute' or 'unconditioned point of view' (ibi. p.l.). What really interests them is the extent 
to which it is possible or desirable to try to transcend particular disciplinary perspectives in 
search of a synthesis. Theyare well aware of the dangers ,which we have already noted, of one 
perspective replacing rather than understanding another.[251 This influences their central 
recommendations concerning the possible choices to be made between the options of what 
they call pluradisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. They reject the appro-
ach of pluradisciplinarity by which different disciplines are joined together without any real 
attempt at synthesis, because this can only mean incoherence and 'scientific babel'. By 
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transdisciplinarity  on the. other hand, they mean the ideal of harmonizing this babel by creating 
a new common language - a sort of scientific esperanto. But this approach is also rejected on 
the basis that it is utopian. Evidence for this is drawn from the deconstructive argument that 
any attempt to mediate between different disciplines invariably faces the difficulty of knowing 
how to tell whether or not a given language game has been successfully translated into another. 
For Ost and van de Kerchove the only viable option is the one they call interdisciplinary  . 
According to this, issues to be understood should be addressed through a series of different 
perspectives, whether sociological, psychological, psychiatric, economic, legal or whatever. 
There can be no hierarchical 	precedence amongst these various independent perspectives 
although, it is suggested, there may be some possibility of dialogue. Perhaps because of this 
hope, however, the approach of interdisciplinarity is seen as inherently unstable, leading 
either to attempts at transdisciplinarity or collapse into pluri.disciplinarity.  
Ost and van de Kerchove, unlike Cotterrell, do treat law as a fully-fledged 
discipline, and would presumably reject his suggestions for prioritizing social 
science. But, like Cotterrell, they do use a social science perspective in 
responding to the clash between law and social science inasmuch as their 
solution to possible clashes between law and science relies on the usual 
strategy for interdisciplinary work within science. The same attitude can be 
seen in the way they treat the 'internal - external distinction' in .legal 
philosophy as if it were isomorphic with the debate between interpretative and 
causal approaches to explanation in the social sciences. Like Cotterrel, 
however, they stress,the value of interdisciplinarity more for the purposes of 
critical appreciation of the limits of perspectives rather than as a route to 
technically improved methods of solving social problems. Efforts to actually 
integrate law with other perspectives are, for them, an unfailing sign of 
technocratic policy concerns. 
But all this begs the question whether disputes between law and social science 
are best handled as if they were comparable to clashes between different 
sciences. What Ost and van de Kerchove's preferred approach offers is a way of 
seeing a problem from many different sides, including the legal one. But, for 
other purposes, other approaches to these clashes may be more appropriate. 
Pluridisciplinarity, for example, may well be a wholly unsuitable theoretical 
solution for interdisciplinary work. Yet this approach, wPll describes u►hst 
is often# found on the ground as a consequence of the various forms of 
institutionalized division of .labour between law and science. in the realm of 
.law and psychiatry for example, some states in the USA adopted "gui-lty but 
mentally ill" verdicts. This may well be 'scientific babel' but could make 
practical sense as an open acknowledgement of the virtues of 
pluridi.sciplinarity when these types of incommensurable languages have to be 
combined. Even within the scientific world, there may be something to be said 
for the juxtaposition of different disciplines as a heuristic device which can 
lead to unexpected progress. We might consider here Durkheim's use of 
biological terms and analogies in helping create sociology; Weber's attempt to 
combine historical and sociological methods; or the difficulty we have in 
deciding whether figures like Newton or Poincaré were primarily scientists or 
philosophers. Whilst we shall see later that there are other arc .nts which 
can be used against 'hybridization' of law with other disciplines this cannot 
be justified simply on the ground that such a strategy is bound to be 
scientifically unproductive: 
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There may also be more merit in the  transdisciplinary approach than is allowed for by Ost and 
van de Kerchove. It may help us see how legal rules and procedures reflect attempts at 
synthesis, successful or otherwise, as in the way the structure of legal excuses such as provoca-
tion or duress has been said to reflect an underlying compromise between neo-classical, 
voluntarist, conceptions of responsibility on the one hand and more positivist, scientific, 
notions of determined behaviour on the other (Kelman 1981). Ost and van de Kerchove's 
arguments themselves offer some encouragement for transdisciplinary work. Otherwise why 
should they look forward to the development of a dialogue between different disciplines or the 
larger picture that can be obtained bya series of disciplinary snapshots? Surely this is because 
the self-understanding of different disciplines is bound to be changed by a greater consciou-
sness of the disciplinary alternatives. Moreover the familiar reflexive problem recurs here. 
These authors' arguments against transdisciplinarity and for interdisciplinarity have to be 
understood as operating at a level higher than any particular discipline if they are to count as 
more than just another disciplinary perspective. Thus it seems as if Ost and van de Kerchove 
have taken from post-positivism the idea that truth is a matter of internal disciplinary coherence 
but then find it hard to stay consistent with that sort of perspectivism in making any general 
statements. 
Moving further along the continuum takes us to an approach which still poses the problem in 
philosophical and scientific language but tries to find an answer which will accommodate the 
different demands of law and science. In a succession of papers Zenon Bankowski has been 
working out the degree of force to be attributed to social science critiques of law. (Bankowski 
1981, 1989). He focuses in particular on attacks on legal methods of fact finding. At the outset 
Bankowski's comments on criticisms such as Frank's which alleged that trials failed to find 'the 
facts' was to reply that the law had its own 'truth-certifying procedures' which could not be 
challenged using criteria belonging to competing procedures. Psychological studies, for exarn-
ple, which purported to show the ineffectiveness of some cross-examination techniques for 
discovering the truth, begged the question whether they had, or could have, a proper under-
standing of law's criteria of truth (Bankowski 1981). At this stage,just as Cotterrell's argument 
can be seen as a.sophisticated justification of attempts to find the 'truth about law', so 
Bankowski's position could be read as a defence of the inviolability of 'law's truth'. In later 
writings, however, he has retreated from any relativistic interpretation of the coherence theory, 
of truth (Bankowski 1989). He now argues that it may sometimes be appropriate to take 
account of scientific criticisms of legal procedures, for example, of the reliability of witness 
identification evidence, even if at other times external critiques should be resisted. 
But this of course brings us up against the meta-theoretical question of how to decide which  
criticisms should be accepted. Bankowski suggests, reasonably enough, that to answer this 
question we must "move to a higher level" from which it may be possible to assess the 
appropriateness of different truth-finding procedures. He talks in functionalist language of 
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the fit between different truth-certifying methods and the tasks they are asked to perform. 
Within the Anglo-American criminal justice process, for example, the police are encouraged 
to apprehend alleged offenders using their knowledge of their previous convictions, whereas 
this information is kept from the court until the sentencing stage. Bankowski adds that it is 
ultimately the prerogative of the law to determine which type of truth-finding procedure to use 
at any stage of its processes. Law may choose between a more or a less restrictive approach 
to constructing its facts and make what use it will of lay, 'common-sense' or scientific perspec-
tives. 
Bankowski's approach certainly demonstrates how legal procedures may make use of more 
than one criterion of truth. As his illustration shows these may then be harmonized or 
deliberately juxtaposed within legal procedure. But for this reason he does not offer us much 
help in showing how to handle genuine competition between  legal and scientific perspectives. 
We cannot assume that police work in collecting evidence can be compared to the use of 
scientific methodology given the legal restraints which shape even this stage. of the criminal 
process. And the veryfact that lawrelates its different truth-finding methods to its institutional 
allocationSof responsibility means that the possibility of irresolvable conflict of perspectives is 
avoided. 
Bankowski's proposals cannot solve the problems that may be raised by external challenges 
when law has no settled procedures or accepted competence to use in deciding the issue. A 
graphic illustration of this in relation to the criminal process can be seen in the recurrent 
difficulties we have in deciding at which point enough evidence has accumulated to justify 
re-opening a case on the basis of an alleged 'miscarriage of justice'. As we know, law can deal 
with this, or any other question by reformulating it in terms of the kind of choice between rules 
or values which it typically handles. But if Bankowski is to help us appreciate when a criticism 
of law has sufficient cogency to be accepted he presumably wants to do more than tell us that 
law has to decide this for itself. Moreover, if his recommendation to think of this choice in 
functional terms is superficially plausible this is because both law and science sometimes use 
functionalist types of argumentation. But insofar as they have competing interests and 
priorities regarding the functions they pursue, the meaning they attach to the notion of function 
will be bobnd to differ so that the dilemma of choice returns. We therefore seem still to be 
left with the problem that law and science pose questions in different ways and that any 
possibility of commensuration is either illusory or else relies on some ambiguous measure of 
apparent overlap between their discourses. 
Probably the most sustained engagement with the implications of this awkward conclusion is 
seen in the work of Gunther Teubner. For him "epistemic authority is claimed by scientific 
discourse and legal discourse, and rightly so" (Teubner 1989b p.38) So he sees the problem 
squarely as how to work out the relationship between two (or more) varieties of internal 
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self-understanding whilst resisting any apparent short cuts or easy answers even when these 
are proferred by the discourses themselves. 
In his earlier work Teubner argued that law's constructions of the world were best seen as 
'strategic' models of reality which could not be judged or impugned by drawing on social science 
perspectives (Teubner 1984, Blankenburg 1984, Teubner 1985). In a series of increasingly 
sophisticated papers Teubner has since bolstered and developed this idea by conceptualizing 
law as one amongst many "autopoietic structures" or "epistemic subjects" each of which operate 
self-referentially (Teubner 1988, 1989a, 1989b). In his most recent paper entitled 'How the 
law thinks', which is of particular relevance to this discussion, Teubner reviews those arguments 
of Habermas, Foucault and Luhmann which may be used to develop a  "constructivist social 
epistemology".(Teubner 1989b) The aim is to 'de-centre' the acting subject so as to focus 
instead on the reproduction of discourses and structures through which this and other ideas 
and practices are constructed. Teubner draws on Luhmann to argue that the form of social 
differentiation in modern society and the functional specialization which accompanies it has 
led to the multiplication of independent centres of cognition each of which produce their own 
reality constructions. Whereas economics, for example 'sees' the world in terms of prices, 
politics does so in terms of power, whilst law addresses it in terms of the distinction between 
legality and illegality. Teubner also adopts a strong version of the post-positivist claim that the 
truth of disciplines depends on their internal coherence and that science does not have a 
privileged access to reality. 
Applied to our problem Teubner argues that legal communications can never succeed in 
satisfying the truth requirements of other discourses and should not attempt to do so. The 
appearance of overlap between law and science is to be understood as an example of 'interfe-
rence'. By this is meant synchronic communications produced by self-refere  n tial systems which 
nevertheless have their own distinct referents within their own discourses. The upshot of this 
is that law regularly finds itself in an 'epistemic trap' insofar as its assumptions and claims are 
"exposed to the test of social coherence" which in modern society is a role assigned to science, 
whilst it can only take account of such requirements in terms of its own discourse. It is under 
these conflicting pressures that law produces what Teubner calls its 'hybrid' notions such as 
'interest' on 'efficiency' which though originally borrowed from external disciplines soon take 
on a legal life of their own. As he argues, however, "incorporation of social science knowledge 
does not solve conflicts between judicial and scientific realities but adds a new reality that is 
neither a purely judicial construction nor a purely scientific construction, but a hybrid creature 
produced in the legal process with borrowed authority from the social sciences but their truth 
validity will be decided in the processes of legal communication" (Teubner id. p.51). The 
notions developed in disciplines such as 'law and economics' are therefore stigmatized as 
having "unclear epistemic status and unknown social consequences", (Teubner id. p.45 ). 
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Teubner is at pains to deny that there can be any 'escape'from the 'epistemic trap'. He rejects, 
for example, the tempting solution charactertistic of positivist writers, and endorsed by 
Luhmann amongst post-positivists, by which law renounces cognitive authority in favour of 
science. This is because law must serve as the ultimate forum for decision-making when 
scientists are in disagreement. Teubner sees it as the special role of sociology of law to show 
that law's cognitive constructions must prove to be unsatisfactory from a scientific point of view. 
Teubner has only one positive recommendation to make. This is that instead of trying to 
produce cognitively satisfactory constructions of reality law should create for itself a strategic 
procedural role. The questions it should deal with should primarilybe concerned with deciding 
the appropriate truth-certifying procedure or forum to which to delegate any particular issue 
in dispute. Law's responsibility has therefore to do with the correct allocation of the burdens 
of risky decisions to collective actors, regulatory agencies, firms, unions, parliament etc. 
Teubner's argument is probably the most original effort to date to deal with the cognitive and 
normative complexities raised by disagreements between law and science. But it leaves a 
[lumber of important questions unclear or unsolved. These concern his conceptualization of 
law's claims to truth, the foundation of his own 'third position', and the merits of his 'procedural' 
model for law. 
There is a telling ambivalence in Teubner's claim concerning law's capacity to know the world. 
On the one hand, he wants to grant law's constructions of reality epistemic authority, on the 
other we are told that law is bound to lose out in competition with science because law's 
'cognitive operations are secondary' (Teubner op. cit. p.41)[261. This mayperhaps be rationa-
lized as an imaginative attempt to consider the problem of law's truth from both laws and 
science's point of view. But, at least in earlier attempts to formulate the argument, it does seem 
as if Teubner endorses scientific claims of superiority over law. Thus he writes at one point: 
"social science writers are not by reason of their closer access to social reality intrinsically 
superior to legal conceptualizations of law in society' (Teubner 1986). If science can take us 
closer to 'reality', whatever that means in this context, can law really be considered an epistemic 
competitor except in terms of its own normative domain? It seems as if Teubner is not so far 
from the views of Kelsen or Luhmann by which law's epistemic autonomy is necessarily tied to 
its distinctive, non-scientific, grasp of the world, as in Kelsen's contrast between the 'logic of 
imputation versus that of causality' or Luhmann's between the 'normative closedeness of law 
as compared to its cognitive openness'. 
Teubner's claims often seem to amount to no more than a re-working of the familiar distinction 
between 'institutional' and 'brute' facts. He argues, for example, that "empirical facts about 
dysfunctions in organized life as a result of scientifically controlled enquiry are in no sense 
more 'true' than legal facts about the violation of corporate duties which are produced under 
the firm guidance of the rules of the law of evidence" (Teubner 1989b p.38 ). Many writers 
have questioned whether there are any'brute' facts. But Teubner chooses rather to emphasize 
the appropriateness of describing all "institutional" facts as empirical since he adds "....and if  
these empirical facts conflict with each other there is no superiority of the scientific constructs 
over the legal constructs" (Teubner ibid. p.38 ). Elsewhere too Teubner has made it explicit 
that for him the law deals in empirical and not only institutional facts and that he is making 
definite claims about law's cognitive understanding rather than merely its attribution of 
normative consequences. As he puts it, the point is that 'Under the pressure of normative 
operations (law) constructs idiosyncratic images of reality and moves them away from the 
world constructions of everyday life and from those of scientific discourse" (Teubner ibid p.34). 
In sum, Teubner poses the problem as one of genuine competition between law and science 
even if law does not quite count as a science. 
This ambivalence is directly linked to a second set of problems which concern the basis from 
which Teubner observes the contest between law and science. Teubner rejects the possibility 
of establishing any higher level 'third position' insofar as modem social differentation has 
destroyed the plausibility of any overall centre of cognition. Yet here too there is an equivo-
cation in his perspective which varies between a consistent perspectivism and a foundational 
confidence in the autopoetic and functionalist theories which provide the source of his 
arguments. Whilst he undoubtedly writes from a systems approach which allows for the 
"observation of observations" he also insists that law, and any other discipline, can only 
understand and regulate the world by self-reflection. Thus he is more cautious than Luhmann 
in claiming a privileged position for sociological systems theory in explaining law (Luhmann 
1985 Appendix). But there is no other obvious basis for his own argument about the relation-
ship amongst disciplines. This, in turn, helps explain the nature of the 'solution'Teubner offers 
to the apparently irresolvable problem of rivalry between law and science. For Teubner there 
can be no cognitive resolution of the problem. He confines sociology of law to the negative 
task of deconstructing law's solutions because, unlike Cotten-ell, he does not endow sociology 
with any special capacity to transcend its own vision. Instead Teubner changes tack and offers 
us a normative  remedy for a cognitive dilemma. 
But can Teubner's turn to procedure solve the difficulties of competing knowledge claims as 
he has posed them? The drawback of this solution from a cognitive point of view is that if law 
is indeed a distinctive discourse it will necessarily also have a distinctive understanding of 
disputes dnd other dispute - processing procedures. So even if its task is confined to that of 
procedural allocation and delegation of responsibilities amongst decision-makers this under-
standing may well diverge from that which other groups and forums have of themselves or that 
which other perspectives would reveal. Can law fulfil its alloted task without distorting the 
significance of the institutions what it is supposed to be servicing? If Teubner is willing to live 
with law's idiosyncrastic constructions in this regard we must ask why he is so uncomfortable 
with law's hybrid constructions of social reality, which, from law's point of view, are just as much 





When examined as a normative prescription Teubner's recommendations raise even more 
difficulties. Procedural techniques have been proposed to increase the possibility of reaching 
scientific truth, as in the philosophy of science arguments of writers such as Popper. But 
Teubner's solution is firmly geared to the successful resolution of disputes rather than to 
serving as a methodological yardstick of truth. But, his shifting of the problem from the 
cognitive to the normative register inevitably means that his normative solution can be 
challenged cognitively all over again. Teubner's recommended procedural solution could be 
attacked, for example, for being less a compromise between competing discourses and more 
an endorsement of law's typical way of dealing with difficulties, as in the way it tries to avoid 
or narrow substantive issues down or concentrates on developing constitutional or other 
frameworks of responsibility. This implicit privileging of the legal point of view is therefore 
open to similar objections to those raised in connection with Bankowski's example of the 
competing truth-finding criteria within the criminal process. If these authors are not just trying 
to give law the better of the argument with science it remains unclear how their understanding 
of law can claim to improve on its self-understanding. 
Although Teubner's proposals are not put forward as political recommendations there is little 
doubt that they do carry such implications. Although it would be wrong to apply to Teubner 
all the attacks levelled at Luhmann for his alleged "false normative modesty" (Frankenburg 
1989), it is plain that a preference for procedure is not politically innocent. Teubner's argument 
here can be seen as a development of his previous discussion of the so-called 'regulatory 
trilemma' (Teubner 198.4). This argued that since law's comprehension of any sphere to be 
regulated is necessarily filtered through its own categories it can only regulate other spheres 
by regulating itself. For this reason law should become 'reflexive' about its own procedures 
and those of the spheres it seeks to regulate rather than aim directly at necessarily unpre-
dictable substantive changes. But this argument as well as Habermas and Luhmann's suprising 
agreement over the virtues of law as a framework rather than as an instrument of change, runs 
the risk of turning evidence of failures of legal regulation into proof of the impossibility of 
successful regulation. In the end the choice not to risk law in schemes of social engineering is 
a political choice, dependent on the risks and benefits of particular interventions rather than 
an inherent necessity imposed by the limits of law. In the same way it is a political choice 
whether to attack or defend law's attempts to cloak its substantive constructions of the world 
in hybrid conceptual language. As Teubner himself indicates, the development of such 
concepts, *hatever their scientific status, provide legal discourse with flexibility, openness, and 
the means of learning through experimentation. The clash of disciplinary perspective's, as he 
argues, can serve as a 'variety pool' for legal innovation, much as the range of cases brought 
forward by litigants provides the possibility for judges to develop the law. So why does he try 
to proceduralize? 
Following this line of criticism, there is also some inconsistency between Teubner's recom-
mendations and his post-structuralist standpoint. According to him the choosing human agent 
is 'de-centred' and must be treated as one of the products of discourse itself. But it is hard then 
to see how Teubner's advice can find its way into the internal reproduction of law, which at 
present seems more than content to produce the conceptual hybrids to which he objects.[271 
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More provocatively, if law's understanding of other discourses necessarily distorts their mea-
ning how can he avoid his suggestions from suffering the same fate - even when he merely tries 
to tell law how to be true to itself. Thus, for all its bravura, Teubner's attempt to explain how 
the law thinks is either redundant or cannot avoid telling it how it ought to think. 
At this stage of the argument we might be persuaded to go right to the normative end of the 
continuum so as to find a solution to clashes between law and science by restricting ourselves 
to an internal interpretation of how law normally deals with such questions. Law is often asked 
to resolve clashes between values such as justice and certainty or deal with conflicts of law 
situations which raise apparently similar issues to the one we have been considering so far. 
Dworkin, for example, sees law as its own meta-theory, reflexively providing its own source of 
authority and validity, seeking to answer the riddle of its own meaning and offer the best. sense 
ofthe valued social practices to which it gives recognition (Dworkin. 1986). And, for him law's. 
best interpretation of itself necessarily includes science's best interpretation of itself.[281 In 
many respects law can also be said to be a richer form of life than science (Guarnieri 1988).[291 
It draws on various disciplines as and when required and contrasts them with robust 'common 
sense'. It maintains a healthy sceptism about the possibility of deriving determinate solutions 
from scientific arguments and reinforces this sceptism in adversarial confrontations at 
court.(Smith 1989) Its mode of argument has been characterized as á paradigm of post-posi-
tivism (Villa 1984) and its internal development can be presented a a model of how a system 
can transform itself by always holding some elements immutable whilst changing others  
(Hofstadter 1985 p.84). 	, 
An interesting recent attempt to develop a legal meta-theory can be found in Bernard Jackson's 
Law. Fact and Narrative Coherence (Jackson 1988). The main purpose of this book is to 
further the application of Greimasian semiotics to the philosophy and sociology of law rather 
than tackle problems of legal truth versus scientific truth. But Jackson's interest in truth as a 
species of narrative coherence means that he too has to confront many of the issues raised by 
post-postivist arguments in law and science. He argues, for example that since 'truth' depends ~h 
coherence within semantic structures rather than on correspondence with 
external facts it is imipossible to claim that law is mistaken if it.-; claims 
about casual relationships or other scientific phenomena are otherwise coherent  
(p.  143). His original contribution, however, is to stress that law's truth 
depends orp the plausibility of its story-telling structures not only in its 
fact-finding enquiries but even when it comes to substantive legal rules. 'Hard 
cases' in law are said to be those in which law has `lost touch with the 
underlying stories which helped shape its earlier rule-making. Jackson urges 
the incorporation of a reflexive sensibility into legal argumentation which 
would oblige legal actors to justify all truth claims about their consLruction 
of legal rules and legal facts and the connection between them (.p. 194-t95). 
The demystification of the trial process th.ìs would permit might show that Lhe 
norm has 'Lost' its meaning over time, as the Erlangen School might pA it: 
(Alexy, 1989), or that a norm had not been created under conditions which would 
now be considered egalitarian or otherwise legitimate. We would not therefore 
have "to endorse the conservative context of existing narrative frameworks".  
(p.  194) . The demand for normative authenticity could lead in this way to 
original legal arguments and the formulation of what Critical Legal Scholars 
call 'deviant doctrine'. (Unger, 1983). 
How far can Jackson help us with our problem of clashes between law and 
science? In his optic, law and science are not seen as monolithic rivals. Each 
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discourse has interdiscursive connections with other forms of social 
communication. Law has some special forms of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic 
distinctiveness as compared to ordinary language, for example in its strain 
towards mono-semioticity, and the special claims it makes about itself. No 
doubt much the same could also be said for science. For Jackson the question of 
clashes between law and science insofar as it is touched on, is primarily seen 
as the problem of being able to tell more than one story of the same event. He 
admits that "the implications of some of the opinions here expressed might lead 
to abandonment of the institution of adjudication altogether" and asks "why not 
enroll a panel of adjudicators from a variety of disciplines, which can look at 
a particular situation in all its wholeness?" (Jackson, 1988,  p.  194). But he 
rejects this solution, which roughly corresponds to the one put forward by ost 
and van de Kerchove, as unsatisfactory on the grounds that "we know too much 
about the stories of others and we habitually make comparisons" (Jackson id.). 
The public, we are told, especially in an era of mass communications, expects 
at least the appearance of consistent treatment before the law, expectations 
which would be bound to be disappointed in any attempt to follow this type of 
solution (c.f. p.  144). But this retreat to legal consistency for the 
maintenance of "social peace" leaves our problem unresolved. If his approach to 
law in terms of narrative coherence is to retain any critical edge over 
Dworkin's 'best interpretation' strategy, his enquiry into the validity of past 
and present legal narratives must employ a variety of disciplines, however 
unpredictable and inconsistent the consequences. Moreover, like Dworkin, he has 
failed to offer a theory of how law should integrate the contribution of other 
disciplines into its own operations. In the end, principles of integrity in 
truth-telling can tell us relatively little about the ideal mix of legal and 
scientific types of argumentation. 
The results of this survey of attempts to derive law's meta-theory from either science or law 
are therefore somewhat meagre. This is so whether we try to get science to get a grip on itself. 
(Cotterrell) or to make law understand itself better(Jackson). Intermediate attempts to 
combine, contrast or separate the two perspectives (those of Bankowski,  Ost and van de 
Kerchove, or Teubner) seem to take us further with our problem but even they have not 
suggested a 'reliable method for reconciling questions concerning the accuracy of factual 
propositions, the correctness of evaluative statements and the authenticity of speakers. On the 
contrary it is these writers who have shown most clearly the difficulties which face attempts to 
construct a new division of labour which would parcel out such questions neatly between law 
and science. 
VI Tm  current controversies bett~een Law and Science 
One reaction to the arguments advanced so far would be to say that too much is being made 
of a theoretical problem which is regularly solved at the practical level, either in the courts or, 
if necessary, by deliberate law reform.[301 In this final section, therefore, I shall offer brief 
consideration of two contemporary controversies which reflect light on the way clashes 
between law and science are dealt with and argued about pragmatically. 
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Although both illustrations are taken from the Criminal Law (where the clash between law and 
science often tends to be sharpest) there are also important differences between them which 
make any common features, they demonstrate more telling. Whereas the first example 
concerns the rules of the substantive law, the second revolves around matters of criminal 
procedure. Whilst in the first case, law is under attack from a relatively 'hard' science, in the 
second it is the 'softer'science of psychology which is involved. Most importantly although the 
first illustration is one where law is resistant to change, the second is one where change is well 
under way. 
The discussion of these controversies could be read as a (partial) sociological account of the 
professional and political context of current competition between law and science. But the 
main point of these case-studies is to show how the approaches assumed or adopted by those 
party to them relates to the possible positions which have been outlined so far. 
Provocation in Law and Science 
My first example, which involves a clash between law and medical science, is taken from 
Clarkson and Keating's recent textbook on criminal law (Clarkson and Keating 1984). In a 
passage dealing with proposed reforms of the excuse of provocation they quote on article citing 
recent medical discoveries concerning the chemical basis of the so called 'fight or flight' 
response to a provoking incident.(ibid.p.553-554) These are said to demonstrate that the 
effects of provocation endure for a considerable period unless and until some reaction is made. 
.This, it is alleged, casts doubt on the legal definition of provocation, which uses the notion of 
a "cooling-off period" to deny the applicability of the excuse to cases where there has been a 
long delay in reacting. The article claims that it would be "perverse for the law to ignore these 
teachings of science and absurd for it to doubt their validity" (Brett (1970) cited at p.553). 
Clarkson and Keating endorse this scientifically based criticism of the law but explain that since 
the present rules also have some scientific support the law should not be changed until there 
is complete scientific consensus. 
In terms of the framework set out before it looks as if Clarkson and Keating subscribe to the 
first position discussed under the heading 'the truth about law' which assumes that law can be 
judged from the standpoint of science. Even though they resist the call for change on this 
occasion they impliedly concede the important point that this legal rule should be taken to 
refer to scientifically determinable events in the world. The demand for scientific unanimity 
seems in this respect to be no more than a temporising measure. 
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We have already seen the theoretical difficulties of this position. It cannot be assumed without 
further argument that the legal rules on provocation do or should follow scientific findings on 
the chemical changes of the "fight or flight response". At the least we need to be shown why 
this particular scientific evidence is material. Other scientific approaches, for example those 
dealing with the psychological apprehension of a provoking incident, might point to important 
mediating factors which intervene between the chemical reaction and the decision to act. Some 
of these disciplines would also offer conflicting accounts of particular cases as well as resting 
on possibly quite different general premises about the explanation of human behaviour. 
More fundamentally, there are those who would deny any direct link between the meaning of 
provocation as a legal category within the legal 'language game' and the behavioural events 
typically referred to in scientific and social scientific explanations. Clarkson and Keating 
perhaps recognise this point by demanding unanimity from medical science before expecting 
the law to yield. Since neither law nor science make unanimity a requirement in their own 
spheres this condition must reflect thé further problem of articulating the relationship between 
scientific developments and legal criteria for change. It would be plausible for law to insist on 
consensus as a normative warrant or 'exclusionary reason' reason (Raz 1975) sufficient to guide 
its decision-making in the presence of rival disciplines. However, once we appreciate that laws 
functioning imposes extra requirements, it becomes clear that new scientific discoveries do not 
of themselves have an automatic claim to legal recognition. There must be specifically legal 
reasons for change. But if this is so why should we not take the opposite tack and try to make 
sense of excuses such as provocation in strictly legal terms? 
An attempt to interpret 'laws truth'to deal with the issues raised by this example will certainly 
do much to confirm our suspicion that the theoretical structure of this excuse is not well 
understood by treating it as concerned with the behavioural state of the accused.1311 There 
are many features, quite apart from the idea of the 'cooling off' period, which are not well 
explained by such an approach.[32) A normative approach is essential to explaining why the 
excuse as such is restricted to murder even though the 'fight or flight' reaction, like any other 
behavioural factor, could refer to all offences. And it is also needed to explain why the related 
offence of duress is available for all offences other, than murder. A historical or policy-oriented 
analysis cohld, it is true, also attempt to account for these facts. Provocation was historically 
linked to the special problem of securing jury convictions for murder at the time the death 
penalty applied, and there is a strong relunctance to extend duress to include murder in case 
it reduces the deterrent effect of the law. But we can see that these considerations have not 
counted as determinate for law, which has, for example, found reason to maintain the provo-
cation excuse despite the abolition of the death penalty. Seen from a legal point of view the 
excuse of provocation serves, it has been said, to show that the law does not expect "the 
self-control of heroes and saints". It therefore helps to convey a symbolic message about the 
boundaries of acceptable conduct and legitimate state punishment by testifying to the self-im-
posed limits within which it is exercised. In these terms provocation as an excuse belongs within 
a normative argument and can only have its character changed as a result of normative 
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countervailing considerations (Fletcher, 1978). The question therefore lx-_crxnes 
how far new evidence about chemical changes can form part of such a normative 
argument. 
Here we face the problem that the definition of provocation makes considerate 
reference to what a reasonable person would have been expected to do in the 
same circumstances, not what a scientific investigation would show actually did 
determine the conduct in question. If the law is only partially willing to take 
into account what the accused actually felt, why should it he interested in 
more abstract problems of scientific accuracy? An answer could lie in the 
changing factors the law has been generally prepared to consider. It has 
consistently set its face against those personal characteristics of the accused 
which it considers to be morally blameworthy or unacceptable on other policy 
grounds, including such matters as short—temper or irritability. But, on the 
other hand, it has increasingly been willing to take account of 
universalizable, morally neutral, characteristics such. as age or particularly 
harsh previous experiences or special vulnerabilities. In all this provocation 
functions as a standard not as a description so as to define the conditions 
whose absence constitutes mens rea.  The bad—tempered person is not entitled to 
plead provocation, however influential this personal characteristic may have 
been in actually triggering the offence. Insofar as evidence about the 'fight 
or flight' reaction is universizable and morally neutral it could therefore he taken into 
consideration. However, the approach of 'laws truth' might also suggest other reasons for 
ignoring such scientific findings. Above all, law might have reasons for setting a time limit, 
albeit an arbitrary one, to the period within which claims of provocation would be acceptable. 
This could be justified in terms of alleged deterrent effects or just in terms of law's need for 
certainty and consistency. A still stronger thesis would be that the important reference point 
for law is really not scientific findings concerning the nature of provocation or supposed effects 
on deterrence of particular definitions. What is crucial is what ordinary people at any given 
time believe to be the case concerning provocation since it is their attitudes and behaviour that 
law seeks to influence. 
According to the approach of 'law's truth', therefore, scientific evidence will be treated as 
relevant only insofar as it can be made material in the light of laws changing self-understanding 
of its point. New scientific findings even when they are unanimous will not be determinant. 
But as we noted earlier this approach also seems to go too far. Scientific discoveries are 
regularly cited by lawyers and experts at court, and referred to by legal commentators and law 
reform bodies outside it, in the expectation that some connection to law can and should be 
made. Scientific findings percolate slowly down to change common-sense and it would be 
strange to argue that it is law's role to reinforce and reproduce existing commmon-sense rather 
than help educate it to change, especially as current legal and common sense conceptions may 
themselves be derived from earlier and now discredited scientific beliefs. It may even be 
argued that law is normatively obliged to take account of such findings in accordance with 
whatever division of labour with science it has forged. The difficulty of keeping law in touch 
with developments in science in case bycase adjudication should be seen as a merely practical 
rather than theoretical obstacle. 
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As we saw before, both of the typical solutions to scientific challenges to the law fail to make 
proper allowance for the dilemma we face in trying to find "the truth of laws truth". Theyadmit 
that we may be uncertain whether a new scientific approach or finding is yet established or 
perhaps unclear whether the existing rules of law successfully capture current conceptions of 
its point. But each approach assumes that a satisfactory answer can be reached by following 
the normal protocols of either scientific or legal judgement. The problem which is not posed 
is the possibility of our normative and scientific protocols pulling in different directions and 
what to do if this occurs. If we look more closelyat the recent historyof the provocation excuse 
we will discover ample evidence of the lively effects of this unresolved and perhaps unresolva-
ble problem, both within the courtroom and in law reform deliberations. in the leading case 
of R v Turner (1975 1 All E R 70) it was decided that common sense opinion about the 
relationship between wanton behaviour and provocation was not something which needed or 
could be bolstered by psychiatrists' testimony. Such psychiatric evidence on behalf of a 
defendant was ruled to be relevant but inadmissable. 'Psychiatry' it was argued, 'bad not yet 
become a satisfactory substitute for common sense of the jury in matters within their experien -
ce". These matters were defined as those concerning human nature and the behaviour of adults 
within the limits of normality. Any other rule of evidence would spell the end of the distincti-
veness of the trial process because; "If any such rule was applied in our courts, trial by 
psychiatrists would be likely to take the place of trial by jury and magistrates. We do not find 
that prospect attractive and the law does not at present provide for it". (p.75). 
In general terms scientific expertise was excluded here on an interpretation of the common 
law principle that such evidence is inadmissable if it is on the very issue the court has to consider. 
On the other hand, scientific evidence has been admitted in very similar circumstances. In 
DPP v B.C. Chewing Gum Ltd (1967 All E R 504, for example, psychologists were allowed to 
give evidence on the possible effects of allegedly obscene collecting cards for sale to young 
children. Lord Parker CJ explained (at p.505) that: 'With the advance of science more and 
more inroads have been made into the old common law principles". Although this case 
concerned children rather than adults, in the case of Lowery (1973 All E R 662) psychiatric 
testimony about the character of a normal adult was admitted when it was introduced by one 
defendant to displace an attempt by a co-accused to put the blame for a murder on to him. 
Taken together these cases show, it is said, that there can be no general answer to the question 
of when to allow in scientific evidence which always will depend on the particular issue in the 
case. Scientists, on the other hand, will have difficulty in seeing any logic in the limitations on 
their expertise implied by the rules of admissability of evidence and will be obliged to try to 
make further inmad on common law principles so as to maintain the coherence of their 
scientific arguments. 
The problem of commensurability between normative and cognitive approaches to provoca-
tion has also arisen in the context of efforts at lawreform. The 14th report of the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee in England, for example, carefully examined the question which should 
be put to the jury when provocation was at issue. They recommended that the jury should be 
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asked to consider 'whether the defendant's action could reasonably be regarded as having been 
provoked'. Theythus acknowledged that an enquiryinto what a reasonable person would have 
done means asking ourselves what we would consider to be reasonable. Of particular interest 
to us, however, is the way the committee struggled to find an appropriate way of formulating 
the question of what was meant by provocation. It reported that originally it had wanted to ask 
the jury to consider whether the facts as they appeared to the defendant could be regarded as 
'a reasonable excuse' for the loss of subjective control leading to the offence. But some 
commentators objected that there could never be said to be a reasonable excuse for taking 
another's life. Theytherefore considered instead using the phrase 'reasonable explanation' in 
characterizing the excuse. But this was also rejected, apparently because it would seem to 
involve the jury 
in too scientific an enquiry. In the end they settled on the formula that provocation must 
provide 'sufficient ground' for loss of control. In this way the committee could be said to have 
solved the problem by offering a form of words which would be equally at home in both causal 
(scientific) investigations and main lyevaluative (normative) enquiries. But the price of making 
two language games commensurable here produces a discourse which is deliberately ambi-
guous and, at worst, meaningless. Once again it seems as if we can onlyreproduce rather than 
resolve our problem. The use of the jury as the ultimate finder of fact may be seen as a resort 
to a forum beyond that of the specialised discourses of science and law. But now we see that 
even the terms in which they are asked to conduct their deliberations confirm the difficulty we 
have in specifying what this means. 
Video evidence, truth and fairness 
If there are serious problems to be faced in responding to scientific challenges to substantive 
legal rules, the difficulties are still greater when we turn to consider criticisms of legal 
procedure. Here normative consideratins of fairness, justice, the claims of common sense or 
the importance of public involvement are not merely additional and possibly competing 
arguments to set against scientific claims but enter into the way the legal process goes about 
constituting its facts. As we have noted, many features of adversarial trials have come under 
attack frdm psychologists, statisticians and others, although recently there have also been new 
attempts to defend the integrity of legal procedures. 
The tangled issues which can arise are well illustrated by the current controversy over the 
introduction of video-links in criminal trials involving child victims of sexual assaults. A pilot 
scheme in operation in a number of courts was partly inspired by the findings of psychologists 
who argued that child witneses were more reliable than was once thought and that when 
exposed to the stress of court appearance many child witnesses suffered greatly and were unable 
to give their evidence. A compaign to allow children to testify in an accompanying room 
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connected by video-link to the courtroom, or to give their evidence on video in preliminary 
hearings subject to various safeguards, was supported by leading criminal lawyers such as 
Glanville Williams and John Spencer. On the other hand, some practicing lawyers resisted 
what they saw as an erosion of traditional trial practice in which the defendant is entitled to 
confront his accuser directly. One of the interesting features of this controversy is the way 
lawyers and scientists were found to line up on both sides of the argument. One intervention 
which shows this particularly clearly was that made by Michael King, a lawyer and psychologist 
working at Brunel University. In an open letter to The Psychologist King (1988) attacked the 
submission put forward by the Public Affairs Board of the British Psychological Society in 
favour of video-links. His letter then gave rise to an interesting further correspondence. 
(Davies 1988) 
The submission by the Society, like many of the arguments advanced by Williams and Spencer, 
appeared to employ a relatively unsophisticated positivist analysis of 'the truth about law'. 
Once psychologists had demonstrated a more effective way of obtaining evidence from child 
witnesses it followed that it was important to reform the legal process so that their evidence 
could be obtained and their suffering relieved. Michael King, on the other hand, argued that 
psychologists had been too enthusiastic to show the value of their skills in the legal process and 
that they may have unwittingly lent their support to a 'moral panic' likely to increase the number 
of alleged sex offenders who ended up being convicted. 
King also made a number of other points. These included the argument that if the issue at 
stake was the stress of appearing at court this was something that applied more generally and 
was relevant also, for example, to victims of rape. The claim being made was not that 
psychologists were unwilling to extend their proposals to include these cases but that they did 
not show enough awareness of the implicit lines they were drawing and indeed of the limited 
control they had over where the lines were to be drawn. Psychologists who did not take into 
account the context of their recommendations could only be described as technocrats who were 
engaged in "removing problems from the public arena of morals and social policy and redefi-
ning them as issues of technique and administrative practice". 
In mounting his attack King also relied on an epistemological claim which brough him close to 
what I characterised previously as the 'laws truth' approach, using an argument which got him 
into some trouble. According to him it was over simple for psychologists to support the use of 
a video-link on the basis that this would allow "more truth" to reach the magistrates. Instead, 
legal proceedings had to be seen as a process of constructing facts within a system of fair 
procedure and not as a disinterested search for truth: "legal truth is not a discoverable entity, 
existing outside the trial process. It is, and only is, a product of the trial process itself' (King 
1988. In the correspondence that followed one psychologist who had contributed to the official 
submission rebuked King for his alleged "extreme and untenable relativism". To argue that 
42 
law produced its own truth could not make sense of the way trials were sometimes found to 
have reached mistaken verdicts or of the manner in which witnesses were sworn to tell the 
truth. Reaffirming the commensurability of law and science, he insisted that 'the epistemolo-
gical differences between the trial and daily life lie not at all in the concept of truth, but in the 
more stringent and well defined notion of permissable evidence". The role of psychologists 
and the case for the video-link depended on their contribution to increasing the availability of 
evidence for the courts to assess. If this was something that had application more widely in the 
legal process so much the better. To this King replied that it was plain that the trial did not 
operate to permit all accounts of events to be brought to the court's attention, especially where 
there was concern that certain information would prejudice the fairness of the trial. But the 
question what was fair or unfair was "a normative one, a moral and political problem for the 
community to decide, not one that could be resolved by science" (King 1988.(331 
If some psychologists had doubts about the applicability of their science, criminal lawyers were 
amongst those who were most insistent on the importance of taking note of it. J.C. Spencer 
advocated increasing acceptance of the lessons which could be generally learnt from psycho-
logy, using the benefits of introducing video-testimony as a case in point. The arguments he 
deployed in trying to overcome resistance to this innovation were a pragmatic mixture of claims 
that psychology could help us learn 'the truth about law' and attempts to interpret 'laws truth'. 
Stress was laid on the ability of psychologists to provide counter intuitive guidelines to help 
law reach conclusions it could not achieve unaided. But Spencer also offered legal arguments 
based on precedents in which evidence was allowed to be submitted in other than the traditional 
oral fashion. At the end of his presentation of all these arguments, however, he concedes that 
there would still be some who oppose this change on the grounds that: 
"they go against the traditions of the common law, or raising the stakes a little higher, contrary 
to its basic principles (Spencer 1988 p.251). His answer to these diehards is that: "all principles 
of criminal justice must either serve to convict the guility, acquit the innocent or help conduct 
the trial in a humane fashion". His closing peroration is worthy of a barrister's summing up: 
"any so called principle which does not further one of these objects is bogus, a dispensable 
supernumeray at best, and more likely a malevolent imposter, seeking to turn the serious 
business of criminal justice into a cynical game" (Spencer id. p.251). It is interesting that the 
fort of Spencer's argument at this point is a rhetorical appeal to the underlying purposes of 
the rules bf evidence. But it cannot be that there is no issue of principle at stake in the 
competing views of truth of the psychologist or the judge. Spencer seeks to make these 
discourses commensurable by moving to a higher level of principle about which few would 
disagree whilst relying on a degree of bluster to obscure the problem that psychologists' 
understanding of basic principles and legal interpretations of their force may not always reach 
the same conclusion. In the absence of any other way of developing the 'truth of laws truth' 
such persuasive techniques maybe all that is possible. But it remains an open question whether 
they are all that is required. 
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This examination of practical controversies demonstrates that they are not isolated from wider 
theoretical debate. Positivism is alive and well both as an approach to law and science and as 
a justification of the division of labour between them. But post-positivist arguments also play 
an important point either in defending law's integrity or as an invitation to a more synthetic 
approach which can satisfy the requirements of both law and science. On the other hand, and 
not surprisingly, theoretical niceties are often ignored in the arocess of finding 
practically acceptable outcomes. on the one hand scientific unanimity is 
demanded in the case of medical science based criticisms of the provocation 
rules, on the other hand experiments in video-links go ahead at the same time 
without any zealous search for or attention to dissident psychologists. Law 
resolves, or attempts to resolve, even what it cannot solve. 
Conclusion 
"Postmodern legal criticism maneuvers precariously between self-enlightenment 
and self-illusion always running the danger of losing itself amidst the 
'enlightenment about enlightenment' in an intellectual nomadism" (Frankenburg,  
1989, p.197). 
In this review of current writing about clashes between law and science I have 
examined the arguments of approaches which attempt to discover 'the t:rnth about 
law', 'law's truth' and 'the truth about law's truth'. The first conclusion 
which can be drawn is the sheer wealth of arguments in play in the 
'conversation' of tR-Aern debates between law and science. All of the above 
approaches can find support in one or another strand of conteuporauy political 
strategy and intellectual fashion. This does not mean simply that we are going 
through a period of flux and confusion -- probably all periods seem that way at 
the time. What is of greater interest is the way different elements of 
positivism and post-positivism or modernism or post-modernism, variations 
between explanatory and interpretive strategies or between a stress on 
cognitive adequacy or normative correctness all figure as argumientative moves 
and counter-moves within theoretical and practical controversies between law 
and science. A second finding which emerges from this discussion is that if 
theoretical perspectives can offer only limited assistance in developing better 
decision-rules to use when law and science compete, the way legal processes 
succeed in deferring, resolving or avoiding the issues does not necessarily 
offer a model of 'good practice' either. Instead, what we have observed is that 
potentially irreconcilable and 'essentially contested' concepts are sxuehow 
deferred, r reconciled or resolved by reference to experts, common-sense, juries, 
politics or whatever, without much claim to overall coherence, A final, 
important point to note is the way scientific and legal perspectives both tend 
to reproduce themselves even when they reach for a meta-level of discourse. 
Scientific and legal approaches may each be used to understand what_ is 
happening as much as to decide what to do about it: no straightforward division 
of labour now seems satisfactory. But it is important not to treat law and 
science as monoliths. There is always some overlap between the 'domain' of .law 
and the extent of legal 'discourse' which helps obscure potential 
incompatibility (Nelken, 1988). As we have seen, some lawyers may make 
arguments in favour of science whilst scientists may defend the virtues of laws 
integrity. From all this we can deduce that theoretical arguments based on the 
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itq-ussibility of developing coherent conceptions of science .in law, or of 
finding satisfactory reasons for action in cases of legal and scientific 
conflict, cannot in themselves be used as a warrant for practical action. We 
should not take the self conceptions of law or of science as a justification 
for political choices leading to the procedural isation of law if only because 
neither law nor science are able to offer a full account of their own 
conversation. 
Footnotes  
1. Earlier versions of this paper were given as presentations at the 
International Conference of the sociology of law, in Bologna, Italy; the 
,fubilee lecture at Lancaster University; in the Faculty of Iaw, Edinburgh 
University and the FacoltA di Giurisprudenza, Macerati, Italy. I am grateful. 
for the questions and comments made on these occasions and also for valuable 
suggestions from Roger Cotterrell., Alberto Febbrajo, Bernard Jackson, 
Michael King, Alex Stein, and Gunther Teubner. 
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2.The examples chosen in this discussion will be taken largely from the social sciences, although 
reference will also be made to a wider range of disciplines from philosophy to history, on the 
one hand, to medicine and statistics on the other. I shall not have space to consider the 
important differences between the so called 'hard' and 'soft' sciences, but it should be noted 
that this contrast has been somewhat attenuated by the post-positivist challenge on which I 
shall be concentrating. 
3.There area variety of ways in which law and science may come into conflict. At one extreme 
the importance of scientific rationality may be urged as a means of improving law and legal 
decision-making and evalating the achievements of different branches of the law. At the other 
extreme, law may be used to expose the uncertainties of scientific reasoning or to adjudicate 
individual cases where science is unable to offer definite answers. As will be seen, I shall not 
be concerned with assessing the details of these various lines of argument but rather with the 
problem of how to understand and determine their changing force. 
4.Cf. Clarkson and Keating (1983 p.101) "It cannot be stated too emphatically that the 
definition of death is not a scientific technical matter". 
5.Cf. Samek (1974 p.298-299) "The quandry of sociological jurisprudence..is..reducing law to 
sociology and showing at the same time that the product of the reduction is law, and not 
sociology". Cf. Bourdieu (1977) on the 'objective limits of objectivism' in social enquiry. 
6.Law too has sometimes been conceived in universal terns in the past and this approach is 
reflected in modern attempts to present law as a part of "practical reason" (Alexy 1989). 
7.Cf. the Explanation offered by Lord Kilbrandon (as quoted in Cowperthwaite 1988 p.24) "the 
legal presumption as to age of criminal responsibility... is one of the comparatively few 
conclusive presumptions of the law, and it shares with such presumptions this characteristic, 
that it enshrines a proposition which is not necessarily true. It is because the proposition may 
or may not be true and because it is considered expedient that the law should provide that 
matters are to be regulated on the basis of the universal truth of the proposition that the 
questioning of the truth of the proposition is for practical reasons prohibited".  
8.Law's attack on the value-judgements inherent in the pursit and application of science, for 
example, with regard to medical research, allows it to pose as the scourge of professional 
expertise on behalf of the layman. 
9.Alexy (1989 p.266ff), for instance, distinguishes the stabilizing, developmental, burden-re -
ducing, technical, control and heuristic functions of legal dogmatics. But it is not clear from 
his discussion how far such a functional approach is or should be derivable strictly from within 
law's own self-understanding. 
IO.Jolowicz refers to Davies v Eli Lily and Co. (1987) 1 W.L.R. 428 at 131-132. 
II.Damaska (1986) claims that the inquisitorial system developed by the 'activist state' in the 
hands of the 'activist judge' is peculiarly concerned with the discovery of 'the truth'. In the 
accusatorial system, by contrast, in which the judge plays more of the role of a referee,.truth is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. 
12.ín some cultures law has served as the vehicle for speculative enquiry even when apparently 
linked to the resolution of practical controversies. Steinsaltz (1976 p.230) offers the following 
interpretation of Talmudic law (which was constructed for the main part under conditions of 
little political independence). 'The basic talmudic view is always that the subject under 
discussion is not 'law' in the socio-legal meaning of the term ... No value is placed on the practical 
or basic significance of a certain problem. The objective is to arrive at the truth, which cannot 
be classified into components by order of importance. When it is necessary to discuss the 
solution to practical questions, certain restrictive measures are employed...The scope of 
discourse is wider than even that of 'pure science' since not only purely theoretical issues but 
even irrefutably disproved methods are examined thoroughly". 
13.Disciplines may behave as rivals as much through similarity as distinctiveness. As Geertz 
(1983 p.107-108) argues, for example, "the lawyer and the anthropologist, the both of them 




14.This division of labour took some time to emerge. As Smith puts it when discussing the 
incommensurability of legal and psychiatric conceptions of lunacy:" for a considerable period 
scientists confused the boundary between discourses for that between the terms of one 
	
20.Cf. Lawson (1982 p.20) "The move of avoiding self-reference by the provision of a meta-level 
discourse." 
	
inevitably reintroduces a realm of possible certainty which provides what may be called a 
ground, a foundation or an absolute. A theory which declares the importance of context is thus 
forced to find a means of escaping the limitations of that context". 
15.For a comprehensive survey of the use of the distinction in debates in social science and 
legal theory see Stylianides (1989) 
21."The great achievement of modern moral philosophy (is) to show how argument and 
justification are possible and may proceed even while the meta-ethics issues of realism and 
objectivity remain controversial, problematic and unclear" (Waldron 1978 p.105). 
16.Dworkin goes on to say that both internal and external perspectives are essential. But he 
insists that any successful interpretation must be jurisprudential in the sense that it must take 
part in the legal argument rather than remain outside it. 
17.Cf. Deighton (1989 p.153). "Sometimes an onlooker sees the game more clearly than the 
players". 'But do any of the team take advice from the stands?" 
18.17rom a philosophic standpoint this dilemma can be likened to Russell's famous set paradox. 
This is soluble, albeit arbritarily, by distinguishing statements about sets from statements within 
them. The possibility that law or science include within their discourses questions which they 
cannot answer should not surprise us after Godel's demonstration of the incompletability of 
any system containing arithmetic. The puzzle to be solved here however has more to do with 
how and where to draw the line between legal and scientific discourse than with what to do 
when reasons or arguments within these discourses run out. 
19.Meta-4heory is defined by Quinton (1977 p.386-387) as "the set of assumptions presupposed 
by any more or less formalised body of assertions, in particular the concepts implied by the 
vocabulary in which it is expressed and the rules of inference by means of which one assertion 
is derived from another. More broadly, operating at the 'meta-level' has been defined as "to 
consider a subject with regard to its definition, purposes, presuppositions, methodology and 
limitations, its status as a contribution to knowledge, and its relation to other disciplines 
(Hunter 1977 p.386). Applied to law, Villa (1988 p.246) describes meta-theoryas "the delicious 
epistemological problem of the nature and justification of scientific knowledge" (my transla-
tion): His substantive enquiry (Villa 1984) concentrates on "the scienticity of judicial theory 
and its relationship with the natural and human sciences". 
22.Foucalt's last writings (Bernauer and Ramussen 1986) deal with the different meanings of 
truth for the prophet (truth as destiny), for the sage (truth as being), for the teacher/ technician 
(truth as techne) and for the parahesiast (truth as the ethos of the person and the situation). 
23.Hart and Honorz refer for example to Weld-Blundell v Stephens 1925 A.C. 956 at 986 in 
which Lord Summer explains that "lawyers causal enquiries are not scientific inquests" but are 
to be determined on common-sense principles". 
24.Beer (1977 p.386) defines a meta-system as "one 'over and beyond' a system of lower logical 
order and therefore capable of deciding propositions, deciding criteria, or exercising regulation 
for systems that are themselves logically incapable of such decision, such discussion or of self 
regulation". 
25.As Ost and van De Kerchove put it (1987 p. 74) "ou elles negligent de prendre en 
consid)ratlon le problematiques juridiques et r)duisent le droit au fait, ou elles r)alisent cette 
prises en compte au risque de la connivance id)ologique et de la pseudo-scientificit))". 
26.For a strong statement of this conception of law as second class scientific knowledge see the 
following comments by Murphy (1989 p.21). 'Law, today, is not just one (or even an official) 
interpretation of the world, one discursive practice to be ranged among others; it is constrained 
to produce knowledge at second hand; knowledge of the rules which govern - or fail to govern, 
as the case may be - the world as it is 'really' known to be - by psychologists, economics, 
accountants and others". 
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27.It is not clear how far Teubner endorses the post-modernist picture of the "anonymous 
existence of codes with a not rationally controllable play of difference"  (Frankenburg 1989 
p.374). Luhmann, for his part considers autopoietic theory to be a product of sociology rather 
than a feature of law's self understanding (personal communication December 1988 Lecce,  
Italy). 
28.Personal communication from Ronald Dworkin June 1988, Florence, Italy. 
29.In retrospect, law often seems less dated than its contemporary science, probably because 
its claims unlike those of science make less pretence to being ahistorical. Thus, writing about 
the trial of the 19th century Italian child murderer Carlo Grandi (L'Ammazzabambini), 
Guarnieri explains'The alienists made it a question of principle. One the one hand, error and 
the prejudices of common sense, on the other the truth of their science which advanced 
according to determinism, equations between bodily signs, mental illness and criminal irre-
sponsibility with the logic of transition by which the third term was the equivalent of the first 
... By comparison with this rigid positivistic rationality which by definition put itself beyond 
objections and enquiry - classical juridical rationality presents itself as a rather wider and 
differentiated approach ... Instead of treating the verdict as the business of an aristocracy of 
experts, it considered it to be inseparable from the shared values of morality and fairness shared 
by public opinion". (P. Guarinieri, L'Ammazzabambini, 1988, p.196 ff., my translation). 
30.What happens outside the courtroom or the law reform committee can be of far greater 
moment than what happens within them. Smith (1981) argues that psychiatry won its battle 
for legal recognition through administrative changes which gave it greater institutional power 
in the control of lunacy, as well as through internal changes which brought about greater 
unanimity within the profession. The current emergence of new professions such as the 
'Guardian ad litem',  whose role is to reconcile competing legal and social work considerations 
bearing on'the needs of children, offers an instructive contemporary example of this process. 
31.This point becomes even clearer when it is appreciated that this discussion only applies to 
the Anglo-American jurisprudence on the meaning of provocation. In Italian Criminal law, 
for example, provocation does indeed apply to all crimes and not only to murder. Nor does it 
include the provisions regarding a cooling off period or the requirements of proportional 
response, which are so hard to rationalise in behavioural terms. These considerations only 
apply where provocation functions as a complete justification, rather than as an excuse, for 
what would otherwise count as the crime of publically insulting someone. 
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32.For example, it is only by treating provocation as a legal 'term of art' that we can make sense 
of the way that English law, until 1957, held verbal insults to be incapable in law of constituting 
provocation. 
33.King has elsewhere produced an extended criticism of psychologists' reliance on laboratory 
and other experimental techniques when applied to problems of truth-finding in law. But he 
does not take the view that 'law's truth' should always be preferred to scientific approaches. 
He is concerned, for example, about the limiting effects of judicial attitudes to child abuse 
cases. The criterion to be adopted is the political implication of adopting a given perspective 
rather than epistemological integrity as a value in itself. (King, personal communication 
November 1989) 
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